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God in the Machine: A New Structural
Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine
Matthew J. Sag

Abstract

This article is a broad reconceptualization of the role of fair use within copyright
law. Fair use is commonly thought of as just one of many exceptions limiting
copyright, in contrast, this article shows that fair use has actually enabled the expansion of copyright protection. Fair use has an important structural role that is
often overlooked. First, copyright necessarily must balance intellectual property
incentives with the protection of free speech and innovation; fair use constitutes
that balancing mechanism. By establishing the outer limits of copyright, fair use
in fact enables an expansive interpretation of author’s rights within those bounds.
Second, because copyright works best by providing flexible principles that can
accommodate technological changes, fair use also constitutes the mechanism by
which Congress has given the courts a large policy making role to ensure copyright’s balance. This article explains this structural function of fair use, then shows
how this theory should and does apply. In doing so, it also identifies two broad
trends emerging in the case law that have previously not been recognized or articulated, despite their significance. These are the principles of consumer autonomy
and medium neutrality.
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Introduction
Yes, yes, our program just insinuated that George Pataki had a big, gay
experience on the Staten Island Ferry. This is the beauty of fair use.1
Fair use plays a vital but misunderstood role in copyright law. The central dilemma
for fair use jurisprudence is that without the flexibility of fair use, copyright would become
unwieldy and oppressive; but if fair use allows too much freedom from copyright, it risks
undermining the incentives that the creators of copyrighted works rely on. Typically, scholars
express concern about one or the other half of this problem as determined by their policy
preferences. This article puts aside outcome driven analysis and examines the larger role fair
use serves within copyright law. It identifies two structural purposes embodied by fair use,
one determining the shifting balance of copyright law, the other determining policy making
authority over copyright law. First, fair use bounds copyright rights, and in doing so it
enables expansive definition of those rights within those bounds. Second, fair use has
allowed Congress to delegate to the courts the difficult policy decisions as to the details of
copyright owners’ rights.
Many scholars have warned, with increasing urgency, that we are approaching the
“tyranny of copyright.”2 This dark vision of a “permission culture” argues that our “creative
ecosystem” is under threat because of certain legal and technological changes that have
increased the rights of copyright owners.3 The potential tyranny of copyright stems from the

*
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Law. Thanks to David Dana, Shari Diamond, Tonja Jacobi and the participants at the Northwestern
University School of Law’s Zodiac forum for their many helpful comments. Thanks also to Oren
Bracha, Marc Gergan, Tony Reece and Larry Sager for their comments on a much earlier draft.

1.

The Daily Show with John Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast, Aug. 3,

2004).
2.
Robert S. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright?, N.Y Times, Jan. 25, 2004; see also,
Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock
Down Culture and Control Creativity (2004); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and
the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 33 (2003); Yochai Benkler,
Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain,
74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999).
3.

Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 2, at 130.
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combination of (1) our reliance on access to and use of existing works and (2) the
increasingly pervasive “ownership” claimed with respect to those works. Consumers and
creators rely on access to existing works, not just in artistic fields but in countless areas of
social, political, cultural and economic activity. Most of the fabric of our cultural and
intellectual lives is owned in some fashion by someone else.4
These concerns are not without foundation, but they are overstated because one
person’s claim of ownership with respect to a work says very little about what others can in
fact do with that work. Significantly, copyright ownership claims are contingent upon the
application of fair use. Reliance on owned works does not necessarily preordain a life of
intellectual servitude. The alleged tyranny of copyright is mitigated in part because copyright
claims are limited by fair use. In the landmark Sony decision, the Supreme Court held that
home video taping of broadcast television programs was not an infringement of copyright.5
Ownership of the copyright in the subject broadcasts was undisputed; what was disputed
were the implications of that ownership. By a five to four majority the Court held that timeshifting by consumers was fair use and thus not copyright infringement.6 The majority
reached this conclusion in spite of the fact that consumers were copying entire programs
without the permission of the copyright owners. The majority also held that Sony, the maker
of the VCR, was not liable for contributory infringement because time-shifting constituted a
substantial noninfringing use for the product.7 Copyright ownership did not make copying
by end users unlawful, and it did not make the VCR an unlawful device.
Sony has become the poster-child decision for both consumers who believe they
have a right to copy and for businesses that provide tools or services related to consumer
copying. However, recent attempts by internet music pioneers Napster and MP3.com to
extend Sony into the internet age both failed.8 These cases, and many others, highlight the
uncertainty of fair use, especially in the context of new technology. Under the current state
of the law, consumers, entrepreneurs, academics, journalists and copyright owners often
cannot know with certainty what will, and what will not, be deemed fair use without all the
joy and expense of federal litigation.
The uncertain scope of fair use undermines its ability to effectively guard the public
interest in legitimate access to, and use of, copyrighted works. For example, without fair use,

4.
Editorial, Free Mickey Mouse, Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 2003, at A16. “The copyright
system, though constitutional, is broken. It effectively and perpetually protects nearly all material that
anyone would want to cite or use. That’s not what the framers envisioned, and it’s not in the public
interest.”
5.

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).

6.

Id.

7.

Id.

8.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG
Recordings v. MP3.Com Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 ([district] 2000).
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some documentaries would never be produced.9 Even with the fair use doctrine, the chilling
effect of potential litigation may discourage many who could otherwise rely on the doctrine.
Recognition of the structural role of fair use has the potential to mitigate some of
the uncertainty of current fair use jurisprudence. The statutory framework for fair use both
mitigates and causes uncertainty. It mitigates uncertainty by providing a consistent
framework of analysis – the four statutory factors. However, when judges apply the statutory
factors without articulating or justifying their own assumptions, they increase uncertainty.
The statutory factors mean nothing without certain a priori assumptions as to the scope of
the copyright owner’s rights; a more stable and predictable fair use jurisprudence would
begin to emerge if those assumptions were made more transparently and coherently. This is
the focus of Part I.
Part II describes the changes in copyright law brought about by the Copyright Act of
1976. Copyright skeptics regard the 1976 Act as an unwarranted expansion of copyright
rights, constituting a triumph of special interest politics over the public good and common
sense. Part II argues that, whatever the politics might have been, the shift to a dynamic
system of copyright rights was a justified response to the combined problems of legislative
gridlock and the expectation of continued technological and social change.
Part III, the heart of this article, examines the structural role of fair use in the
context of an evolving copyright system. Those who see fair use as stemming the tide of
expansive copyright rights are bound to be disappointed. Rather, it is argued that fair use is a
structural tool that allows copyright to adapt to changing circumstances. This article
establishes this argument in two stages. First, recognition that the structural role of fair use is
to enable broader more flexible rights to be vested in the copyright owner. Second, it shows
that in order to preserve copyright’s ability to adapt to new technology, fair use must remain
a somewhat open-ended standard developed by the judiciary through the imperfect process
of common law adjudication.
Ultimately, the assumptions as to the proper scope of the copyright owner’s rights
can only be developed by deriving fundamental principles from copyright law itself. Exactly
what those fundamental principles might be is obviously a matter of debate; but it is much
narrower debate than that which is required by reference to normative conceptions of the
good in general; and it is much more likely to result in stability and predictability in fair use
jurisprudence than any of the cost-benefit approaches advocated in the literature. The
Supreme Court’s emphasis on transformativeness in its most recent fair use decision,
Campbell v. Acuff Rose,10 is an important step toward a more coherent fair use doctrine;
however, there are additional steps to be taken and other fundamental principles within
copyright law beyond its preference for transformative uses. This recommendation is the
subject of Part IV.

9.
Robert Greenwald’s Uncovered: The Whole Truth About the Iraq War
([production company] 2004), and Outfoxed: Rupert Murdoch’s War on Journalism ([production
company] 2004) (both rely on fair use); see Lawrence Lessig, Copyrighting The President, Wired,
12.08, Aug. 2004, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.08/view.html?pg=5.
10.

510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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There are three principles of copyright law over and above transformativeness that
judges can apply to give substance to the structural role of fair use. The first is the well
established principle of the idea expression distinction. Recent case law suggests two other
principles are emerging, but have yet to be articulated. These are the principles of consumer
autonomy and medium neutrality. This article identifies these trends and their potential to
provide a more principled and consistent basis for fair use analysis.
Part I—The Limits of Statutory Guidance on Fair Use
The difficulty of adjudicating fair use cases is well established. Almost every
comment on the subject notes that fair use is “one of the most troublesome [doctrines] in
the whole law of copyright.”11 One of the central difficulties of fair use jurisprudence is the
indeterminacy of the statutory factors. The statutory codification of the fair use doctrine
requires courts to consider four factors in determining whether a use is fair: (1) the purpose
and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion taken; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for, or value of, the copyrighted work.12
The statutory factors provide a useful framework for analysis, but their limitations
must be explicitly recognized. The core limitation of the factors is that in order to determine
their application one must make an a priori assumption as to the scope of the rights of the
copyright owner. The challenge for fair use jurisprudence is to find a rational and consistent
basis for those assumptions – the first step in that process is to admit that assumptions are
being made. The current practice of most courts, treating the factors as outcomedeterminative as opposed to question-framing, masks a priori assumptions and distorts
judicial reasoning.
Some commentators question whether the factors are relevant at all. David Nimmer’s
study of the relevance of the four factors concludes that they are not outcomedeterminative, either individually or collectively.13 Nimmer surveyed the application of each
of the four factors in 60 fair use cases decided between 1994 and 2003.14 According to
Nimmer’s (admittedly subjective) assessment, the factors corresponded with the ultimate
finding only 55% , 42%, 57% and 50% of cases respectively.15 Even in the few cases in
which all four factors appeared to line up in the same direction, either fair or unfair, they still
had no predictive value.16 From Nimmer’s perspective, the four factors uniformly pointed to
one conclusion in eleven of the sixty cases, however, that clean sweep only corresponded
with the actual result in six of those cases; i.e. in 54% of cases. “Basically, had Congress

11.

Dellar v Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939).

12.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (date).

13.
David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” And Other Fairytales of Fair Use, 66 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 263, 280 (2003).
14.

Id. at 268.

15.

Id. at 280.

16.

Id. 282–284.
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legislated a dartboard rather than the particular four fair use factors embodied in the
Copyright Act, it appears that the upshot would be the same.”17
Nimmer’s findings must be treated with some caution because litigated cases may not
tell us anything about the broader universe of fair use disputes.18 Nonetheless, Nimmer’s
findings provide rudimentary support for this article’s contention that the four statutory
factors are largely incapable of determining the outcome of fair use cases in any objective
sense. The next four subsections briefly review the statutory factors to demonstrate that they
are not outcome-determinative and that significant assumptions must be made before the
factors can be applied.
A. Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor as to whether a use of a work is a fair use is “the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes.”19 The law in with respect to this factor has weaved a
curious path. Commercial uses have been held fair,20 educational uses have not.21 The
Supreme Court’s comment that there are no bright line rules for applying the fair use
doctrine,22 appears, if anything, to be an understatement.
In 1984, the Supreme Court majority in Sony declared that “every commercial use of
copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation”23 In 1994, the Court was asked
to adjudicate the fairness of 2 Live Crew’s indisputably commercial parody of an old Roy
Orbison song in Campbell. In that case, the Court held that there was no presumption that
commercial use was unfair. As the Court observed, “[any such presumption] would swallow
nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107, including news
reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities . . .
which are generally conducted for profit.”24
The Campbell decision also marked another more subtle departure from Sony
concerning the purpose and character of the use. In Sony, the majority categorically reversed
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the absence of a productive use precluded the application of

17.

Id. at 280.

18.
See George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection Of Disputes For Litigation, 13
Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1984).
19.

17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (date).

20.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 571 (1994).

21.
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996)
(unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted works in university course packs not fair use); Basic
Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same). Madey v. Duke also
illustrates the uncertain privileges of educational institutions in the context of patent law’s
experimental use doctrine; see Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir., 2002).
22.

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.

23.

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).

24.

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
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fair use.25 “Productive use” in this context means that the use leads to the creation of a new
work which results “in some added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first
author’s work.”26 According to the Ninth Circuit decision, convenience, entertainment and
increased access were not purposes within the general scope of fair use.27 In Sony, the
majority of the Supreme Court held that the productive/unproductive distinction could
never be determinative of fair use.28
Ten years later, the Supreme Court in Campbell substantially reintroduced the
productivity requirement under another name—the key question now being whether the
allegedly infringing use is “transformative.” Justice Souter, delivering the opinion of the
Court, explained that the central purpose of the fair use investigation was to determine:
whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original . . . or
instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character,
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other
words, whether and to what extent the new work is transformative.29
For Justice Souter, transformative works “lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright.”30 Accordingly, while
unproductive or untransformative uses are not to be presumptively denied fair use
protection, the heart of the doctrine is reserved for “transformative” uses. The dominance
of the transformativeness test makes the actual statutory language regarding noncommercial and educational uses largely irrelevant.31
Also, the extent to which a use is “transformative” is clearly a meta-factor: the extent
to which a use transforms the work cannot be determined without reference to the other
factors, such as the nature of the original work, the quantitative and qualitative similarity
between the works and the effect of the use on the value of the original work. The merits
and limitations of transformativeness are discussed in Part IV below. The purpose of the
defendant’s use is still important, it is just as clearly a subjective determination. Bright-line
distinctions, such as commercial/non-commercial and educational/non-educational, have
been superceded by a much more ambiguous notion, transformativeness.

25.

Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 971–972 (9th Cir. 1981).

26.

Sony, 464 U.S. at 478 (Blackmun dissent).

27.

Universal, 659 F.2d at 970.

28.

Sony, 464 U.S. at 455.

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (internal quotes and citations omitted); see also, Pierre
29.
Leval, Towards A Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1111 (1990).
30.

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.

31.
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1395 (6th Cir.
1996) (Circuit Judge Merritt, dissenting).
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B. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor considered by the courts in applying the fair use standard is “the
nature of the copyrighted work.”32 Two aspects of the nature of the work are important to
consider: whether the work is factual as opposed to creative; and whether the work is
published or unpublished.
In principle, the more creative the original work is, the more justification is required
to establish a fair use in relation to it.33 Anecdotally, this aspect of the nature of the work
tends not to be regarded as significant.34 The Supreme Court did not consider the creative
nature of television programs or musical compositions to be an obstacle to a finding of fair
use in Sony or Campbell. At the other end of the spectrum, the Second Circuit has held that
the copying of one factual work by a rival was not protected by fair use.35 The second factor
is especially unhelpful in cases involving parody, because parody is predicated on the
existence of an antecedent creative work. As the Supreme Court noted in Campbell, in the
context of parody, the second factor “is not much help . . . in separating the fair use sheep
from the infringing goats.”36
After the Supreme Court’s majority decision in Harper & Row v. Nation
Enterprises,37 it briefly appeared that use of an unpublished work could almost never qualify
as fair use.38 The Nation had published a 300 to 400-word extract of the soon-to-be
published memoirs of President Gerald Ford dealing with the Nixon pardon, preempting an
article that was scheduled to appear in Time magazine. Time had agreed to purchase the
exclusive right to print pre-publication excerpts of President Ford’s memoir; but as a result
of the defendant’s article, Time canceled its agreement. The majority held that “[u]nder
ordinary circumstances, the author’s right to control the first public appearance of his
undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use.”39
Two cases from the Second Circuit followed and enlarged this ruling. In Salinger v
Random House,40 the Second Circuit held that a literary biographer of reclusive author J.D.
Salinger was not permitted to quote from a selection of Salinger’s unpublished letters and
drafts. In New Era v Holt,41 the same court held that the quotation of unpublished material

32.

17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (date).

33.

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.

34.
According to Nimmer’s analysis, it actually has a negative correlation with the
outcome. Nimmer, Fairest Of Them All, supra note 13, at 280.
35.

Financial Information, Inc v. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir.

36.

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.

37.

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).

38.

Id. at 555.

39.

Id. at 555.

40.

Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).

41.

New Era Publications v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).

1984).
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to establish a variety of critical assertions with respect to L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of
Scientology, was equally unavailing on fair use grounds.42 In both cases the court held that
unpublished works normally enjoy “complete protection against copying any protected
expression.”43
In 1992 Congress revised Section 107 and made it clear that “[t]he fact that a work is
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon
consideration of all the above factors.”44 In light of Congress’ clarification of Section 107,
the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper & Row is easier to reconcile as deriving from the
fact that the work in question was soon-to-be published, not that it was unpublished.45 In
any event, the nature of the copyrighted work remains unhelpful in assessing whether an
activity is protected by fair use or not.
C. Amount And Substantiality of the Portion Used
The third factor to be considered in adjudicating fair use is “the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”46 The need
for both a quantitative and a qualitative inquiry harks back to Justice Story’s original
formulation of the fair use doctrine in Folsom v. Marsh.47 In that case, Justice Story was
concerned to protect the “chief value of the original work” against the extraction of its
“essential parts” through the mere “facile use of scissors” or its intellectual equivalent.48 In
theory, the greater the portion of a work that is copied, the less inclined a court will be to
find in favor of fair use. In practice, several cases confound this basic proposition, relying
instead on subjective qualitative impressions or suppositions as to the value of the work.
In Harper & Row, the defendant copied a mere 300 words from a 200,000-word
manuscript, yet the Supreme Court held that this constituted a substantial taking under the
third factor.49 This extraordinary conclusion only makes sense in context of the Court’s
manifest disapproval of the conduct of the defendant, particularly the manner in which it
obtained access to an advance copy of the biography and its scoop of the Time magazine

42.

Id.

43.
Salinger, 811 F.2d 90; New Era Publications, 873 F.2d at 583; see also Leval, supra
note 29, at 1113.
44.

Amended 10/24/92 by Pub. L. No. 102-492.

45.
Leval, supra note 29, at 1120. Note that Judge Leval authored both the Salinger and
New Era opinions overturned by the Second Circuit: Salinger v. Random House, 650 F. Supp. 413,
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) rev’d & rem’d 811 F.2d 90, (2d Cir. 1987) and New Era Publications International,
ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 ([S]D.N.Y., 1988) aff ’d on other grounds 873 F.2d 576
(2d Cir. 1989).
46.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (3) ([date]).

47.

9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).

48.

Id. at 345.

49.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985). The
words were not even entirely sequential, see Edward Samuels, The Illustrated Story Of
Copyright 155 (2000).
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story. In Sony, the majority of the Supreme Court found that home videotaping entire
programs for later viewing was fair use.50 In Campbell, the Supreme Court held that even
though rap musicians 2 Live Crew had copied the heart of the original Roy Orbison song –
the first line of lyrics and characteristic opening bass riff – nonetheless, the defendant’s
appropriation could be protected by fair use.51 The Court reasoned that copying the heart of
the song was excusable because it is the heart which most readily conjures up the song for
parody, and also because it is the heart at which parody generally takes aim.52
The point to be understood is not that the amount of the work used is never
significant; but rather that while the third factor provides a convenient platform for
bolstering existing conclusions, it provides little ex ante guidance. The question of qualitative
significance is inextricably tied with the fourth factor because each requires the court to
assess the “value” of the original work. The third factor does not rely on mechanical
quantification of the amount of the original work used, it asks courts to asses how much of
the value of the original work is present in the later use. Similarly, the fourth factor asks what
the effect the later use will have on the value of the original work. Thus both the third and
forth factors require the determination of the antecedent question – the value of the work.
In each case, the value of the original can only be determined with reference to scope of the
copyright owner’s rights of exclusion; treating the statutory factors as outcomedeterminative, as opposed to question-framing, ask us to believe the opposite is true.
D. Market Effect
The fourth statutory factor in fair use analysis is “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”53 In short, the fourth factor asks
“what is the market effect of the unauthorized use?” It is worth exploring this factor in
some detail, first because it is sometimes said to be the most important factor,54 and second
because questions of market effect dominate academic literature. Assessing the market effect
of an unauthorized use confronts judges with a potential circularity: while their ultimate
ruling defines the scope of the market, they are supposed to examine the market effect in
making that ruling. In other words, they must make a ruling based on a finding that is
contingent on their ruling. This theoretical circularity is mitigated by the reality that judges
begin with a view as to the proper scope of the copyright owner’s rights and then apply the
statutory factors in a manner that transforms those priors into conclusions.

50.

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984).

51.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994).

52.

Id.

53.

17 U.S.C. § 107(4) ([date]).

54.
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision on fair use warns that the statutory
factors are not to be treated in isolation, rather “[a]ll are to be explored, and the results weighed
together, in light of the purposes of copyright.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578; but see Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 566 (fourth factor undoubtedly single most important element of fair use); Princeton
Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (factors not created equal,
fourth factor at least primus inter pares).
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As a preliminary matter, it is clear that analysis of market effect must include the
effect on the copyright owner’s continued exploitation of existing markets and her potential
exploitation of markets she is yet to enter.55 If unexploited markets were left to fair users by
default, copyright owners would find themselves in a race to exploit their works in as many
markets as possible to preserve their future rights. The author of a novel would rush to
make some token exploitation in every context imaginable; from the plausible (sequels,
screen-plays, and television series) to the unlikely (soft toys, action figures, and private-label
credit cards).
Although considering potential and derivative markets is clearly necessary, it raises
the problem that copyright owners can claim that almost any new use of their work is part
of an unexplored derivative market. For example, although it had shown no interest in
licensing a derivative of “Pretty Woman” in the rap genre before its lawsuit against 2 Live
Crew, Acuff Rose (Roy Orbison’s publisher) argued that 2 Live Crew’s parody diminished its
potential to do so. The Supreme Court lent credence to these kinds of argument by
remanding the case in Campbell to the district court to determine whether the 2 Live Crew
parody had dampened the potential demand for non-parody derivatives of the original song
in the rap genre, a market hitherto unexplored by the copyright owner.56
The uncertainty of the original work’s potential market necessitates defining the
limits of that market in order to ascertain whether the allegedly infringing use has any effect
on it. This encourages a kind of circular reasoning: findings of fair use are premised on
narrow market definitions; while denials of fair use are premised on expansive market
definitions. The reasoning is circular because although the fair use question determines the
extent of the market, the extent of the market also determines the outcome of the fair use
question.
Two cases concerning photocopying illustrate the potential circularity of examining
the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work. In both Williams
& Wilkins Co. v. United States,57 and American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,58 academic
journal publishers alleged that their copyrights were infringed by defendants making
unauthorized photocopies of journal articles for medical and scientific research. The two
cases, decided almost 20 years apart, are barely distinguishable on their core facts, and yet
reach entirely opposite conclusions.
The difference between the cases lies in the latter court’s willingness to find that the
publisher suffered an adverse market effect. The Court of Claims in Williams & Wilkins held
that the evidence on the record failed to show that the defendant’s photocopying practices
caused a significant detriment to the plaintiff. In American Geophysical, the Second Circuit

55.

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593–594.

56.
Id. The Court remanded the case back to the district court to hear evidence as to
the likely effect on the market for a non-parody, rap version of original song. It is puzzling to
consider what evidence the Court thought would be produced. See 4–13 Nimmer on Copyright
§ 13.05.
57.

203 Ct. Cl. 74 (1973) aff ’d by equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).

58.

60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
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also concluded that, based on potential sales of additional journal subscriptions, back issues,
and back volumes alone, the evidence of an adverse market effect was weak.59 However, the
majority of the Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff prevailed on the fourth factor
because of the availability of licensing facilitated through the Copyright Clearance Center
(“CCC”).60 The majority found that through this collection organization, the publishers had
created “a workable market for institutional users to obtain licenses for the right to produce
their own copies of individual articles via photocopying.”61 In the opinion of the majority,
the potential licensing revenues that would be forgone by publishers if a finding of fair use
was made itself constituted an adverse market effect under the fourth factor.
Any copyright owner who loses an infringement action because of a finding of fair
use has also lost at least one potential licensee, although in some cases the prospects of a
license are more theoretical than real.62 The majority in American Geophysical argued its
reliance on potential licensing revenues was not circular because: “[o]nly an impact on
potential licensing revenues for traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets
should be legally cognizable when evaluating a secondary use’s effect upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”63
However, the addition of the “traditional, reasonable, or likely” requirement does
not entirely mitigate the problem of circular reasoning. Determining whether a market is
“traditional, reasonable, or likely” is indistinguishable from determining the scope of the
copyright holder’s rights: both require courts to make an a priori assumption and then
compare that assumption to the conduct of the defendant. The Second Circuit comes close
to transparency in American Geophysical by at least identifying the assumption that it is
making— that journal photocopying falls within the traditional, reasonable, and likely to be
developed market of the copyright owner—but it does little to actually justify this
assumption.
Such assumptions should be carefully considered, especially in the context of market
effect, because of the danger that courts will reason backwards from the fact of
marketability to the construct of property.64 The CCC was established in 1977 to license

59.

Id. at 928.

60.

Id. at 929.

61.

Id. at 930.

62.
In several prominent cases it appears that the plaintiffs were unwilling to license at
any price, whereas, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell a settlement including an ongoing
license was in fact negotiated. See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God,
Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000); New Era Publications v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d
Cir. 1989); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987); and Rosemont Enterprises,
Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
63.

American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).

64.
Julie Cohen makes this criticism in relation to the INS case in which the Supreme
Court found a quasi-property right in news based on a misappropriation theory. Julie E. Cohen,
Lochner In Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy Of “Rights Management,” 97 Mich. L.
Rev. 462, 507–508; see also Int’l News Serv. v. AP, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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photocopying after the decision in Williams & Wilkins.65 This begs the question: if a
centralized clearinghouse was established to license parody, review or reference to a class of
works, would it establish the existence of a “traditional,” “reasonable,” or “likely” market for
such activities?66 In Campbell, the Court held that there is no protectable derivative market
for criticism, including parody because:
[t]he market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of
original works would in general develop or license others to develop. Yet the
unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or
lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the very notion
of a potential licensing market.67
If the members of the MPAA established a rights clearing center for reviews and
parodies of, and references to their movies, would unauthorized review, reference and parody
suddenly cease to be fair use? There may be good reasons to not give copyright owners to
expand control over certain uses of their works, even if they are offering to license those
uses.
As with the third factor, the fourth factor is conceptually important but incomplete.
In order to determine market effect, a court must first form some idea as to what the market
is, as emphasized by the Second Circuit’s holding that the market in question must be
traditional, reasonable or likely to develop. The problem with the fourth factor, and with all
the factors to some extent, is that they focus on second order questions and invite courts to
gloss over the real basis for their rulings – how they came to define the boundaries of the
copyright owner’s rights in the first place.68 To answer this antecedent question, courts must
look beyond the statutory guidance in Section 107 and confront theoretical questions about
the nature of copyright.
E. The Search For Reasons
The four statutory factors that courts must consider in deciding fair use cases
provide a useful framework for analysis but they are far from complete. By mandating that
all decisions in this area at least consider the factors, the statute generates more fine-grained
65.
It is tempting to speculate that had the CCC existed earlier, the decision in Williams
& Wilkins would have been the same as American Geophysical. However, this seems unlikely. The
Court of Claims considered and rejected the possibility of licensing schemes. In his dissenting
opinion in American Geophysical, Justice Jacobs argued that the CCC scheme was “neither
traditional nor reasonable; and its development into a real market is subject to substantial
impediments.” American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 937 (Jacobs J. dissent).
American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 937 (Jacobs J. dissent); see also Lydia Pallas
66.
Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission
Systems, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 38–39 (1997).
67.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (emphasis added).

68.
Lloyd Weinreb argues that although the Supreme Court cast its analysis in Sony and
Harper & Row almost entirely in terms of the statutory factors, “the application, not to say the
interpretation, of the factors is so tailored to the circumstances of the cases, that one is impelled to
look beneath the surface of the opinions for the true ground of decision.” Lloyd L. Weinreb, The
1998 Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, Fair Use, 4 Fordham L. Rev. 1291, 1299- (1999).
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points of comparison. All other things being equal, this should make fair use decisions more
consistent. However, judges need to recognize that the factors only provide a framework for
their analysis by raising certain second order questions. Applying the factors still requires
making first order assumptions as to the scope and value of the copyright owner’s rights.
This is particularly true of the third and fourth factors, which require courts to first define
the value of the copyrighted work, in order to determine how much of the value of the
work was used by the defendant, and also to determine how the value of the work was
affected by the defendant’s use. Neither of these questions can be answered without first
deciding what the value of the work is in the abstract, or how far the copyright owner’s
rights in relation to it should extend.
Courts inevitably fall back on assumptions as to what the legitimate scope of the
copyright owners’ rights should be. More precise articulation and more coherent justification
of those assumptions should lead to more predictable fair use decisions over time because,
to the extent that judges agree on these first order considerations, clearer rules will emerge.
Even where judges initially disagree, such disagreements will be resolved by the usual
considerations of precedent.
The remainder of this paper considers what kind of assumptions courts should be
making in fair use cases. As Parts II and III elaborate, the fundamental starting point for the
assumptions that fill the gaps in the statutory factors is an understanding of the dynamic
nature of modern copyright law and the structural role of fair use. Part IV examines the
jurisprudential implications of the structural analysis of fair use and recommends that judges
should justify their assumptions as to the proper scope of the copyright owner’s rights in
terms of fundamental principles derived from copyright law itself. This bounded normative
inquiry is more likely to result in stability and predictability than either a simple cost-benefit
or unrestricted reference to normative conceptions of the good in general.
Part II—Copyright as an Evolving System
As noted in the previous part, the statutory formulation of the fair use doctrine
raises significantly more questions than it answers. The indeterminacy of the statutory
factors stems from congressional recognition of the desirability of judicial policy making.
Fair use is the mechanism by which Congress transferred significant policy making power to
judges in order to allow copyright to adapt to ongoing social and technological change more
effectively than a purely legislative response would allow. Doctrinal recommendations that do
not take account of this structural role of fair use are necessarily limited in their descriptive
or prescriptive analysis. Some of these attempts and their weaknesses are considered Part IV.
Understanding the structural role of fair use in copyright law is the first step towards
developing a more coherent fair use doctrine. This part examines the overall structure of
modern copyright law as the context for understanding the structural role of fair use.
The Copyright Act of 1976 can be seen as the culmination of the transformation of
American copyright law, from the regulation of literal reproduction to a system of general
rights which protects the more abstract notion of the value of creative and intellectual
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works.69 This transformation has greatly expanded the number of works covered by
copyright, and the political and economic significance of the rights that copyright vests in
authors and their assignees. Copyright’s transformation and associated expansion have been
viewed with alarm by many in the academic community because of the perceived threat to
free speech, innovation and creativity.70 The expansion of copyright has also been criticized
as a victory for special interests – publishers, broadcasters, the recording industry and movie
studios – over the generalized public interest in the free exchange of information.71
Without necessarily disputing any of these claims, this article tells another story
about the significance of the changes in the structure of American copyright law. The effects
of copyright law are prone to technological disruption. Even preceding the digital age, new
technology such as the juke box and the photocopier conflicted with people’s settled
expectations of the rights of copyright owners and the freedoms of the public. In 1976,
Congress decided to alter the structure of copyright law to make it more responsive to
technological change. Congress replaced potentially limited and technologically specific
rights with rights that were more broadly expressed, in order to allow copyright law to be
more flexible in its treatment of new technologies.
The 1976 Act was a significant departure from its predecessor in a number of
respects. Three changes greatly increased the number of works subject to copyright and the
duration of copyright protection for those works. First, the new Act changed the default rule
for the application of copyright, from opt-in to opt-out. Under the 1909 Act, an eligible
work received no federal copyright protection until its publication, and even then only if
certain formalities were observed.72 In contrast, the 1976 Act applies to all eligible works
from the moment of their creation, although until 1989 it was still the case that a work
published without the proper form of copyright notice would instantly become part of the
public domain.73 Second, the new Act increased the maximum duration of copyright
protection from 56 years from the date of publication, to the life of the author plus 50 years
for most natural persons and 75 years from the year of first publication for anonymous

69.
Oren Bracha, From Privilege To Print To Ownership Of Works: The
Transformation Of American Copyright Law 1790–1909 (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Harvard University Law School) (on file with author).
See, e.g., Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 2; Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking
70.
Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, [?]66 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 173 (2003); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J.
283 (1996).
71.
Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 53 (2001); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright
Grab, Wired, Jan. 1996, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html.
72.
The 1909 Act expressly allowed the state common law copyright to protect
unpublished works.
73.
Jessica Litman, Sharing And Stealing, 27 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 1, 15
(2004); See, e.g., J. A. Richards, Inc. v. New York Post, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1938)
(copyright void for failure to comply with the formalities).
U of M Law School Publications Center, April 28, 2005, 1:49 PM
Page 14
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art4

MTTLR 11-2

Edit Format Document

GITM MTTLR Version

works, pseudonymous works and works made for hire.74 Third, the new Act jettisoned the
requirement of copyright renewal, thus extending copyright protection even more
significantly for the vast majority of owners who failed to renew their terms after the initial
28 year period.75 The cumulative effect of these extensions was that more works were
protected by copyright and that copyright protection lasted considerably longer.
Although these changes are significant, there was a much more fundamental change
to the nature of copyright itself: the broadening of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.
The 1976 Act significantly increased the scope of copyright owner’s rights by rephrasing
them in considerably more general terms.
The new Act gave copyright owners five “fundamental rights” to be offset against
subsequent exceptions.76
The approach of the bill is to set forth the copyright owner’s exclusive rights
in broad terms in section 106, and then to provide various limitations,
qualifications, or exemptions in the 12 sections that follow. Thus, everything
in section 106 is made “subject to sections 107 through 118,” and must be
read in conjunction with those provisions.77
The contrast in drafting styles between the two Acts is significant. The 1909 Act
granted rights that were static in nature and had to be constantly retrofitted by Congress.78
Public choice theory predicts that legislative outcomes will be the product of interest
group competition in a political market place.79 In that political marketplace, small groups
with concentrated interests will mobilize more effectively than large groups with diffuse
interests. The application of public choice theory to the 1976 Act is fairly obvious: well

74.
17 USC 302. Extended to the life of the author plus 70 years and 95 years
respectively by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998.
75.
According to Lessig, renewal rates were so low in 1973 that the average term of
copyright protection in was only 32.2 years. Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 2, at 135.
76.
The exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and
display. See House Report No. 94-1476; 17 USC 106 (1) through (5). In 1995 Congress added the
digital audio transmission right specifically reserved for sound recordings, 17 USC 106(6), Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995).
77.

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 ([date]).

78.
The 1976 gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to: “(1) reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; [and] (2) prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work.” In contrast to this general and technologically neutral language, the comparable
section of the 1909 Act vests the following exclusive rights in copyright owners: “(a) To print,
reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work; (b) To translate the copyrighted work into
other languages or dialects, or make any other version thereof, if it be a literary work; to dramatize it
if it be a nondramatic work; to convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama; to
arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model or
design for a work of art.”
79.
See generally, Mancur Olson, The Logic Of Collective Action: Public Goods
And The Theory Of Groups (1971).
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represented copyright holders, such as the media, received a significant increase in both the
scope and duration of protection; well represented copyright users such as libraries received
special treatment by way of exemptions; the unrepresented public discovered that their
residual freedoms, and the public domain, had decreased accordingly.80
In her book, Digital Copyright, Jessica Litman provides a compelling and detailed
account of the decades of protracted negotiation that that led to the passage of the 1976
Act.81 Two related features stand out in this account: (1) revising the Copyright Act has
proved difficult and time consuming; (2) special interest group representatives have had an
unusually direct influence in drafting the new Copyright Act.
The first major revision of the Copyright Act in the 20th century was completed in
1909; it took until 1976 to achieve another one. The intervening period witnessed the
Depression, two world wars, and the invention of a variety of devices that would come to
transform copyright, including: talking motion pictures, the radio tuner, television, the
jukebox, the photocopier, the computer, videotape recorders and musical synthesizers.
During this period, there were almost continual but unsuccessful efforts by both Congress
and various interest groups to revise the 1909 Act in light of these developments.
Litman offers a standard public choice explanation for the revised structure of the
Copyright Act that was eventually passed in 1976: conflicts between represented interests
were solved by increasing the surplus to be divided (by expanding copyright) at the expense
of the greater public.82 The public choice account is convincing in its own terms, but it
overlooks the considerable merit of adopting a dynamic copyright structure. To understand
why this is so, and the significance for fair use, it is helpful to consider some of the literature
on the choice between rules and standards.
In an ideal world, copyright law would accommodate at least three different
constraints: incentive optimization, administrative efficiency and adaptability. First, the law
would create sufficient incentives to encourage and sustain the production of society’s
optimal level and quality of intellectual and creative output. Second, the rights established by
that law would be sufficiently certain to allow them to be observed and enforced with
minimal administrative and transaction costs. Finally, the law would adapt to social and
technological change, so that it continued to comply with the optimization and
administrative efficiency criteria.
Obviously no such law exists. In fact, there is an inherent tension between the
administrative efficiency criteria and adaptability criteria. In theory, laws that are more
specific have a lower cost of administration, but that same specificity makes them more
likely to produce undesirable or paradoxical results in response to unforeseen situations. In
other words, specific laws are prone to obsolescence. At least three considerations govern

80.
Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 71. Peter Drahos tells the same story on a
global scale concerning the 1994 Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and the adoption of the
TRIPS agreement. See Peter Drahos, Information Feudalism: Who Owns The Knowledge
Economy? (2001).
81.

Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 71.

82.

Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 71.
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the legislative choice to make laws more or less specific. First, although rules are associated
with lower compliance costs, they are typically harder to write in the first place. In contrast, a
legislative standard is easier to write but shifts costs from the law making body to those who
must comply with the law because of both information costs and uncertainty.83
The second consideration in choosing between rules and standards is determining
how the law should change in response to new circumstances. Laws which are dramatically
affected by social and technological change must be regularly adapted to new circumstances.
Received wisdom tells us that standards are easier to keep up-to-date than rules.84 Standards
do not require continual legislative intervention to adapt to changing circumstances because
they are only given content through their application to particular situations. Accordingly, in
spite of their increased compliance costs, standards may be preferable where the
opportunities for legislative resolution are limited; this observation leads directly to the third
consideration, public choice theory.
As noted above, public choice theory holds that interest group competition affects
legislative outcomes. An important extension of simple public choice theory also suggests
that interest group competition in a multiple veto-point political system affects legislative
style as well as policy direction.85 The active involvement of a number of interest groups
with non-aligned or only partially aligned interests makes finding a specific compromise on
any particular issue difficult. The more interest groups, the more difficult that prospect will
be. In the U.S., building consensus is even more difficult because the complexity of the
legislative process results in multiple veto points.86 The passage of legislation requires a
majority in the relevant committees, the House, the Senate and Presidential approval. The
more specific a bill is, the more difficult it is likely to be to secure all the required majorities.
Obstacles to more specific legislation may have a compounding effect in an
environment that is known to be prone to external shocks. The parties involved should
anticipate that if legislation was difficult to pass initially, it will also be difficult to amend in
response to unforeseen circumstances. A risk averse interest group might prefer incomplete
legislation which transfers the forum of conflict from a one-shot legislative solution to an
ongoing judicial process. Consistent with this theory, Attiyah and Summers have commented
that Congress adopts incomplete policy instruments and relies on case law to determine the
content of the law more than other comparable nations.87

83.

Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557

84.

Id. at 617.

(1992).
85.
Tonja Jacobi, Explaining American Litigiousness, A Product Of Politics, Not Just
Law (2004) (working paper, on file with author).
86.

Id.

87.
P.S. Attiyah & R.S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law
(1987), from 298.
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Incomplete legislation does not lead to anarchy: where Congress fails to act, courts
fill the void, completing incomplete policies in a process that is only nominally interpretive.88
In spite of frequent references to ‘activist judges’ in political rhetoric, judicial policy making
may arise as much from legislative abdication as from judicial usurpation. Indeed, there is a
view that Congress routinely passes the task of resolving unpleasant political issues to the
courts.89 For example, Congress could have resolved the issue of home video taping through
legislative action before the Supreme Court was forced reach the issue in Sony, but the
“chance to do nothing and blame it on another branch of government was predictably hard
for Congress to resist.”90
In sum, where Congress knows that a specific policy provision would be initially
difficult to draft, would be rapidly made obsolete by external changes, and would be difficult
to rewrite in response to those changes, it may rationally (or expediently) choose to enact an
incomplete policy, leaving it to the courts to add content to that standard by applying it to
particular situations as they arise. Congress’ broad definition of the rights of copyright
owners and its incomplete codification of the fair use doctrine both fit neatly with this
description.
Congress’ intention in recasting the exclusive rights in such broad language in the
1976 Act was to change the way copyright law dealt with new technology. Previously, courts
had typically resisted extending copyright protection to new technologies without explicit
legislative guidance.91 The adoption of broadly stated exclusive rights in the new Act was
intended to “change the old pattern and enact a statute that would cover new technologies,
as well as old.”92
The legislative history shows that Congress was aware of the extent to which the
existing balance of copyright protection had been disrupted by past technologies, such as the
player piano and the photocopier.93 The congressional record also indicates that Congress
realized that it was not in a position to anticipate the implications of social and technological
changes yet to occur.94 Just as Congress was aware of the difficulty, ex ante, of specifying the

88.
19 (1985).

Id. at 308; see also Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform

See, e.g., Frank J. Macchiarola, The Courts in the Political Process: Judicial Activism
89.
or Timid Local Government? 9 St. John’s J. L. Comm. 703, 704 (1994).
90.
Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway, From Gutenberg to the Celestial
Jukebox 121 (rev’d ed. 2003).
See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394
91.
(1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl.
74, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973), aff ’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
92.

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 457–458 (1984).

93.
The revision effort leading up to the 1976 Act was “[s]purred by the recognition
that significant developments in technology and communications had rendered the 1909 Act
inadequate.” Sony, 464 U.S. at 463 (1984). S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 47 (1975).
94.

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476; S. Rep. No. 94-473 (1975)
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application of copyright to technological developments, it was also aware of the
unlikelihood that it would be able to respond ex post in a manner that was either timely or
effective.95 In short, Congress appears to have understood that any new copyright law would
have to be broadly expressed to allow it to respond dynamically to unforeseen events
because the politics of copyright reform were such that its own ability to respond would be
limited. The shift to a dynamic copyright regime, implemented in the 1976 Act, may have
been the product of special interest politics, but it was also sound public policy in light of
copyright’s susceptibility to technological change.
One of the first technologies to put the 1976 Act to the test was the VCR. In 1984,
the Supreme Court held that the manufacturer of the VCR, Sony, was not liable for selling a
machine that could lead to widespread reproduction of copyrighted materials.96 This ruling
indicated to some that the courts would be unable or unwilling to adapt copyright to
embrace new technology as Congress intended. Indeed, Justice Blackmun’s dissent criticized
the majority on just that basis.
It is no answer, of course, to refer to and stress, … this Court’s “consistent
deference to Congress” whenever “major technological innovations” appear.
Perhaps a better and more accurate description is that the Court has tended
to evade the hard issues when they arise in the area of copyright law. I see no
reason for the Court to be particularly pleased with this tradition or to
continue it. Indeed, it is fairly clear from the legislative history of the 1976
Act that Congress meant to change the old pattern and enact a statute that
would cover new technologies, as well as old.97
The majority stressed the importance of allowing Congress to determine the
appropriate response to new technology throughout its decision.
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been
assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should
be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate
access to their work product.
...
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected
representatives of the millions of people who watch television every day
have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have
enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such
copying possible.98
95.

Id.

96.

Sony, 464 U.S. at (1984).

97.

Id. at 457–458.

98.
Id. at 429, 456; see also id. at 431 (“Sound policy, as well as history, supports our
consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for
copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to
accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by
such new technology.”)
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However, the rhetoric of deference employed by the majority must be carefully
assessed in light of its actual ruling. The majority did not find the Copyright Act inapplicable
to the video cassette recorders; nor did it hold that new technology always required new
legislation. What it did say was that under the current law, although other forms of
reproduction using a VCR may have been infringing, non-commercial time-shifting
constituted a fair use of the new technology. The majority did apply the new Act to the VCR
as Congress intended. Whether that application was the same as the one Congress might
have made is another question altogether.
Part III—Fair Use in the Context of
an Evolving Copyright System
One of the criticisms of the new copyright regime implemented in 1976 is that the
interaction of broadly expressed exclusive rights with narrowly crafted exceptions has a
ratcheting effect on copyright protection. The rights of copyright owners adapt to
technological challenges, whereas users’ rights are diminished or marginalized. This concern
is particularly pronounced with respect to the possible effects of restrictive licensing and
technological measures, such as digital rights management. The expectation that fair use
should preserve the balance of copyright assumes there is one unique and identifiable
balance to be preserved, it also assumes that the past is a better reflection of that balance
than the present. If the function of fair use was to preserve users’ rights, or maintain the
status quo, it would appear to be failing dismally.
On the other hand, if the success of fair use is measured by the extent to which has
enabled copyright law to smoothly adapt to new challenges, fair use is doing pretty well.
Understanding fair use from a structural perspective tells us something more about fair use
than is revealed by the observation of individual cases. The structure of the Copyright Act
and the history of copyright law indicate that the true function of fair use is to enable
copyright law to evolve in response to new challenges without necessitating legislative
intervention. As this section elaborates, fair use is fundamentally different from the majority
of other exceptions that limit the rights of copyright owners because it is both dynamic
(unlike most exceptions) and contextual (unlike the idea expression distinction). Significantly,
like the idea expression distinction, fair use is also a constitutionally required feature of
copyright law. All of this makes fair use very significant. In addition, a structural analysis of
fair use indicates that the doctrine is meant to be used as a flexible standard through which
the judiciary can determine the application of copyright in response to social and
technological changes – fair use was never intended to preserve the status quo in the face of
change.
A. The Nature of Fair Use
Unlike the most other exceptions to the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, fair use is
a dynamic standard. As a statement of legislative policy, the fair use doctrine is undeniably
vague. Section 107 of the Copyright Act states that “the fair use of a copyrighted work is
not an infringement of copyright.”99 Section 107 also provides a non-exclusive list of six
examples of fair use (criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research) and four non-exclusive factors for courts
99.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005).
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to consider in applying the doctrine.100 The vagueness of the fair use provision stands in
marked contrast to the specificity of many other sections of the Act, and it begs the
question of why Congress adopted rules in some places and standards in others.
The narrowness of the static exemptions is easily illustrated. The Act creates a
statutory exemption allowing libraries to copy an existing published work to a new format if
the existing format has become obsolete.101 There is no privilege to upgrade to a format that
is merely superior or more convenient, and persons other than libraries have no such express
right at all. Many other exemptions follow a similar pattern, applying only to a particular
special interest and only with respect to a limited class of conduct.
The Audio Home Recording Act (“AHRA”) of 1992 demonstrates the limitations of
the Act’s many static exemptions. The AHRA reflects a deal between music industry
interests and device manufacturers. Under that deal, device manufactures agreed to pay
royalties for, and include technological limitations in, digital audio recording devices.102 In
return for these royalties and technological restrictions, music industry interests consented to
a provision in the Copyright Act which immunizes noncommercial copying using a digital
audio recording device or a digital audio recording medium.103
The AHRA was a static and narrow solution to a particular problem: Congress could
have legislated as to the legality of consumer home audio copying more generally, but failed
to do so. The AHRA has no application to a consumer who converts CDs to MP3 files, nor
do the royalty provisions apply to MP3 players.104 Consequently, the AHRA amendments to
the Copyright Act have been entirely inconsequential in the public furor that has surrounded
MP3s, file-sharing and webcasting in the past few years. As the AHRA illustrates, in a fastchanging environment, even detailed rules that perfectly address a group’s concerns tend to
ultimately fail in that aim.
Unlike the idea expression distinction, fair use contextual. This difference has
important implications. The idea expression distinction is dynamic and universal in its
application. The idea expression distinction, which holds that “no author may copyright his
ideas or the facts he narrates,”105 is one of the fundamental axioms of copyright law.
Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information contained in an
author’s work, it merely protects the expression of those ideas and information.106 The idea

100.

17 U.S.C. § 107 ([date]).

101.

17 U.S.C. § 108(c) ([date]).

102.

Goldstein, supra note 90, at 132.

103.
The provision does not make this conduct non-infringing per se, rather it cannot
form the basis of an action for copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 ([date]).
104.

Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.

1999).
105.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985); 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) ([date]).
106.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–219 (2003).
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expression distinction is not an exemption from copyright, it is statement of one of its
inherent limitations in scope.107
The idea expression distinction is very important but it is not the appropriate vehicle
to resolve every tension in copyright, because it does not contextualize. For example, the
idea expression distinction does not provide a means to distinguish between the partial
copying of a work for an academic or critical purpose and the same conduct for some lessfavored purpose. Nor can it be used to take account of the difference between private use
and non-private use. The idea expression distinction focuses solely on the alleged copying in
question; it does not take into account the circumstances, effects and motivations
surrounding that copying.108 Thus the idea expression distinction protects a computer
programmer who copies an application protocol interface (“API”) to enable her program to
interface with the original, but it does not protect the copying of the entire program that was
part of the reverse engineering process that uncovered the API in the first place.109 However,
reverse engineering is protected by fair use.110
The difference between the idea expression distinction and fair use is particularly
important to understand because the two are so often confused.111 An example of the
confusion between the idea expression distinction and fair use is the mode of criticism
directed at a series of admittedly problematic cases. In Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol
Publishing Group, Inc., a district court held that The Joy of Trek, a guidebook for the Star
Trek uninitiated, infringed the copyright in the original series.112 In Castle Rock
Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., the Second Circuit held that The
Seinfeld Aptitude Test, literally a sequence of hundreds of trivia questions and answers
relating to the Seinfeld series, also infringed the copyright in the original series.113 In each

107.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ([date]). Section 102 of the Copyright Act sets out the subject
matter of copyright and also states that “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work.” Id.
108.
This follows under either the ordinary observer test, or a more structured inquiry.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930) (observer test for substantial
similarity); Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (abstraction, filtration
comparison test for substantial similarity).
109.
Cir. 2000).

See Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603 (9th

Id. at 608 (Defendant’s intermediate copying during the course of its reverse
110.
engineering held a fair use as a matter of law.)
111.
4–13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03 (defense of fair use often invoked without
reference to the particular use employed by the defendant, and merely as an alternative label for
similarity that is not infringing because it is not substantial).
112.
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 334
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
113.
(2d Cir. 1998).

Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141
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case the amount of expression from any individual broadcast or the series in total was slight
and fragmentary, but remarkably the courts had little trouble characterizing the guide book
and the aptitude test as substantially similar to the plaintiff ’s copyrighted work. A number of
scholars, such as Matthew Bunker,114 have characterized these decisions as misapplications of
the fair use doctrine. These decisions are extraordinary, but not primarily by virtue of their
failure to find fair use.
In these cases, courts appear to have mischaracterized as derivative works those that
simply reference but do not reproduce the plaintiffs’ copyrighted material. If we suspend
disbelief and assume that, the work of the defendants in these cases was indeed substantially
similar to that of the plaintiffs, and that the extent of that similarity was significantly more
than was required for their analysis or criticism of the original, then the courts were correct
to find in favor of the plaintiffs. The courts in Paramount and Castle Rock appear to have
confused potential profit for protectable interest. The mere fact that the defendant was
attempting to profit by catering to the significant public interest in Seinfeld and Star Trek
does not establish any protectable similarity between books discussing the television
programs and the programs themselves.
Fair use has a significant structural role in copyright, relying on fair use to make up
for erroneous decisions on whether there was presumptively actionable copying in the first
place can only further distort and confuse fair use analysis. Fair use is structurally unique
among all the limitations and exception to copyright rights, because it is both dynamic and
contextual. The structural role of fair use does not include playing catcher every time a judge
misses the ball.
B. The Roles of Fair Use
Given the 1976 Act’s grant of expansive and pervasive copyright rights, fair use has a
role to play in maintaining a constitutionally acceptable balance between copyright and
freedom of speech. This role warrants brief description but is well understood. What is less
recognized but equally important is fair use’s structural role within copyright. The First
Amendment provides that in part that Congress “shall make no law… abridging the freedom
of speech.”115 As a consequence, government restrictions on speech, such as laws against
flag burning,116 and private law actions that effect speech, such as libel,117 are greatly
restricted by the First Amendment. Copyright is a federal law that restricts speech by
creating an exclusive property right in original expression contained in a tangible medium,
albeit for a limited time. The possibility that copyright has a harmful effect on freedom of
speech has increased because of the expansion of copyright ownership as discussed in the
114.
Matthew Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The “Transformative” Use Doctrine After
Campbell, 7 Comm. L. & Pol’y 1, 10–16 (2002). Bunker also criticizes the Ninth Circuit’s Dr. Seuss
opinion on the same grounds. Id. But that case may have been soundly decided based on the
similarities between the defendant’s back cover illustration and the plaintiff ’s book, as opposed to
“similarities in typeface, poetic meter, whimsical style or visual style.” Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1997).
115.

U.S. Const. amend. I.

116.

Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).

117.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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previous section. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has consistently held that copyright does
not present a danger to freedom of speech because of the idea expression distinction and
the fair use doctrine, copyright’s “own speech-protective purposes and safeguards.”118
Fair use serves an important constitutional role in maintaining a balance between
establishing incentives for the creation of works and guaranteeing sufficient access to those
works to preserve a constitutionally acceptable level of freedom of speech. However, as
Rebecca Tushnet observes, it would be a mistake to simply equate the scope of fair use with
the scope of freedom of speech required by the constitution—the two concepts are
interrelated but they are not coterminous.119 More is required of fair use than simply
satisfying the requirements of the First Amendment.
Fair use turns out to be the final arbiter of the rights of the copyright owner in a
broad range of situations. Current and recently decided fair use cases have asked courts in
various jurisdictions to determine whether and to what extent:
•

a defendant was entitled to base a test preparation on a copyrighted reference
book;120

•

a large computer hardware manufacturer was entitled to copy illustrations and
phrases from a guide to computer injury prevention for use in its own from
safety guide;121

•

a city police department was entitled to display a criminal defendant’s
photographs in the course of its investigation;122

•

a hip-hop magazine was entitled to copy and distribute the early unpublished
works of a prominent recording artist to expose his alleged racism;123

•

a public interest group was entitled to publish a private company’s internal emails
relating to its electronic voting machines, to inform the public about alleged
problems associated with those electronic voting machines;124 and

•

a defendant was entitled to publish a book containing its own photographs of
the plaintiff ’s copyrighted Beanie Babies.125

118.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–219 (2003); see also Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556–558 (1985).
119.
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535 (2004). Tushnet argues that fair use alone may not be
enough to clear copyright of all First Amendment concerns.
120.

Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2004).

121.

Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2004).

122.

Shell v. City of Radford, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190 (W.D. Va. 2005).

123.

Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26143 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

124.

Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

125.

Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 333 F. Supp. 2d 705, 707 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
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It seems unlikely that any consistent theme will emerge from the ultimate disposition
or settlement of these cases. Nonetheless, these cases are conceptually linked. In each case
the broad statement of the rights of the copyright owner set out in the Copyright Act is
incomplete—it does not by itself determine the ability of the copyright owner to control the
use of his or her work.
While others have suggested that fair use should be seen as more than “a grudgingly
tolerated exception to the copyright owner’s rights of private property,”126 typically these
explanations stop short with the observation that the exclusive rights can not be absolute.127
Once that point is conceded, it still remains to be answered why fair use is necessary in
addition to the specific statutory exemptions, compulsory licenses and the idea expression
distinction.
Indeed, fair use is not a necessary or inevitable feature of copyright law in the
abstract—it is nonetheless a fundamental principle of the our copyright law today. In theory,
the role played by fair use in limiting the rights of copyright owners could be performed by
specific statutory exemptions, compulsory licenses, or a more concrete statement of rights in
the first place. Alternatively or in addition, we could rely on high enforcement costs, private
ordering solutions and norms of forbearance and reciprocity to moderate any adverse
effects of overbroad copyright protection.
In spite of the theoretical possibility of copyright without fair use, copyright law has
in fact developed a fundamental role for the doctrine. From its inception, the fair use
doctrine has facilitated the expansion of copyright by providing a flexible limiting principle
that defines the outer limits of the copyright owners’ rights.128 As discussed in the previous
section, in 1976 Congress again significantly expanded the rights of copyright owners by
rephrasing their exclusive rights in broad technologically neutral terms. At the same time,
Congress transferred significant policy making responsibility to the courts by incorporating
fair use as a flexible standard in the 1976 Act. It is not a coincidence that Congress chose to
codify fair use as a standard at the same time that it radically expanded copyright rights in the
1976 Act.
On an operational level, findings of fair use establish both limits on the rights of
copyright owners and affirmative rights in the hands of users. However, it would be a
mistake to view the function of fair use as restraining copyright owners or empowering users
for its own sake. Structurally, fair use transfers significant policy making responsibility to the
judiciary, allowing judges to develop the law in response to external changes. This structural
role of fair use is significant because of the perceived inability of the legislative process to
keep pace with the demands of rapid technological and social changes. A flexible, forwardlooking set of owner’s rights, combined with a flexible fair use doctrine, allows Congress to
legislate less frequently and entrust significant policy responsibility to the judiciary.
Judicial policy making may trouble those bound up in literalist theories of
democracy, but it is not without precedent. Courts exert a significant policy making role in

126.

Leval, supra note 29, at 1135–1136.

127.

Id. at 1136.

128.

Sub-section C.1. explains the origins of fair use in more detail.
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other areas, such as antitrust law. The fair use doctrine requires courts to determine the limits
of the copyright monopoly and adapt copyright law in response to both incremental changes
and external shocks.129 The role of fair use is especially significant given the impact of new
technology on copyright.130
This is not meant to convey the impression that Congress has somehow limited its
capacity to provide legislative solutions to the questions raised by new technology. On the
contrary, Congress can and should continue to play an active role in the development of
copyright law.131 What it does mean is that Congress does not need to rush to legislative
solutions, and that it need not fear that its inaction will bring the system to a grinding halt.
There are two aspects to the structural role of fair use. First, fair use provides the
flexible and dynamic boundary on copyright rights that makes their expansive and flexible
definition feasible. Second, a flexible and dynamic copyright system necessitates giving
judges significant policy making power over both the application of copyright rights and the
fair use doctrine. Congress could have relied on specific codified exceptions to the exclusive
rights instead of a dynamic fair use standard. However, specific exceptions face the same
problems as specific owner’s rights – they require constant revision in the face of social and
technological changes affecting copyright. The rationale for broad and dynamic exclusive
rights is equally applicable fair use, flexibility requires delegation. Realistically, Congress is
institutionally incapable of legislating on copyright with the frequency that would be
demanded under a system with more specific rights and exemptions due to the daily changes
in the environment in which those rights are exercised.
Structurally, fair use is both a point of flexibility within copyright and a mechanism
of delegation. Copyright protection has lengthened, broadened and deepened as a result of
the 1976 Act; fair use cannot be expected to counteract these reforms, its role is to adapt the
law Congress has made to society’s changing needs.
C. The Effect of the Structural Role of Fair
Use on Copyright Owners
Fair use has been characterized as a “tax” on copyright owners, a “subsidy” in favor
of particular groups,132 and a fundamental right of the public in relation to copyrighted
129.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). (“The fair use doctrine
thus permits and requires courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
130.

In the words of the House Report, “there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the
statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change...[T]he courts must be free to adapt
the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476; S. Rep. No. 94473 (1975) at 66.
131.

Indeed, Congress has enacted detailed rules regarding the copyright liability of internet
service providers, the circumvention of encryption and related matters in the Digital Millenium
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998).
132.
Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
“Newtonian” World of On-Line Commerce, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 115 (1997); see Cohen, supra
note 64, at footnote 5 for other similar references.
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works.133 All of these characterizations miss the mark because of their focus on the case-bycase operation of the fair use doctrine, as opposed to its overall structural function.
Fair use is more than sum total of winners and losers of particular cases; from a
structural perspective, fair use provides a point of flexibility in copyright law that facilitates
adjustment to unforeseen changes. One implication of fair use’s structural role is that that it
advantages copyright owners as a class. The claim that fair use systemically advantages
copyright owners is not susceptible to empirical proof: it relies on comparison with a nonexistent world in there was no fair use doctrine as we know it today. In order to make the
case that fair use advantages copyright owners, I examine the origins of the doctrine in the
19th century and the application of fair use today in the debate over private sphere uses of
copyrighted works.
1. The Origins of Fair Use
The fair use doctrine emerged as part of copyright’s shift in focus in the 19th century
from an economic privilege of the printing industry to a system of rights centered around
an abstract notion of authorship.134 In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, copyright in both
England and the U.S. was confined to “the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting,
publishing and vending” protected works such as books, maps and charts.135 In spite of the
nominal switch from printer’s monopoly to author’s right achieved by the Statute of Anne in
1710, copyright remained firmly rooted in the practices and technology of printing until the
mid-1800s.136 In the early 1800s, copyright infringement was limited to verbatim
reproduction, or replication with only colorable changes made merely to evade the copyright
owner’s rights.137
In 1839 in Gray v. Russell, Justice Story signaled his view that copyright infringement
should extend well beyond verbatim and evasive reproduction, in order to protect the
“quintessence” of the work and its economic value, not just the owner’s interest in
printing.138 Justice Story began this expansion in Gray v. Russell by qualifying the previously

133.
DanThu Thi Phan, Will Fair Use Function On The Internet?, 98 Colum. L. Rev.
169, 212 (1998).
134.

Bracha, supra note 69.

135.
U.S. Copyright Act 1790, Section 1. (Protected matter itself limited to maps, charts
and books). English law was similar at the time. Loren, supra note 66, 13.
136.
The simplicity of this general characterization is not intended to deny the existence
of a more complex historical process or suggest that this transformation was entirely even. For a
more detailed account, see Bracha, supra note 69.
137.
See Loren, supra note 66, 13–15; Bracha, supra note 69, at 36; Gyles v. Wilcox, 2
Atk. 141 143, 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (Ch.1740). In Cary v. Kearsley, Lord Ellenborough declared,
“[the presence of] part of the work of one author is found in another, is not of itself piracy, or
sufficient to support an action; a man may fairly adopt part of the work of another: he may so make
use of another’s labors for the promotion of science, and the benefit of the public.” Cary v. Kearsley
4 Esp. 168, 170 (1802) (spelling modernized).
138.

Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 (No. 5,728) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839).
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understood position that an abridgment of an existing work did not constitute infringement,
a proposition that in Justice Story’s words “must be received with many qualifications.”139
Two years later in the case of Folsom v. Marsh,140 Justice Story was able to further
articulate the substance of those qualifications, giving rise to what would become known as
the fair use doctrine. Justice Story ruled that to determine whether a selection from a
copyrighted work constituted copyright infringement courts must: “look to the nature and
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree
in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of
the original work.”141
This formulation not only encapsulated the fair use doctrine prior to its codification
in the 1976 Copyright Act, but the influence of Justice Story’s summary also remains
discernible in the statute’s four factors which dominate judicial analysis of fair use today.142
Both Gray and Folsom cast the rights of the copyright owner in terms of the market
value of the work in question, as opposed to narrow rights of literal or evasive reproduction.
The centrality of market value in Justice Story’s abstraction of the protected work is
manifest. In Gray v. Russell he explained the need to protect the work, both from extracts
that sought to “supersede the original work under the pretence of a review,” and
abridgments which “by the omission of some unimportant parts… prejudice or supersede
the original work” or compete with the original in “the same class of readers.”143 These
points were reiterated in Folsom v. Marsh:
It is clear, that a mere selection, or different arrangement of parts of the
original work, so as to bring the work into a smaller compass, will not be held
to be such an abridgment. There must be real, substantial condensation of
the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not
merely the facile use of the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts,
constituting the chief value of the original work.144
Fair use was not only coincident with this significant expansion in the rights of
copyright owners, it was the fundamental doctrinal tool facilitating that expansion. During
the 19th century, copyright began to outgrow literalism and refocused around a broader and
more conceptually challenging notion of the work as an abstract object with economic value.
Before fair use, copyright owners’ rights were narrowly defined and the public at large
retained a broad freedom to, among other things, extract and abridge existing works. Fair use
enabled a significant expansion of owners’ rights by establishing a limiting principle that
subordinated the public’s interest in the use of copyrighted works to the owner’s economic

139.

Id.

140.

9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).

141.

Id. at 348.

142.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994).

143.

Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1038. [?]

144.
omitted).

Folsom v Marsh 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (citations
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interests; an irony that is often lost on modern observers.145 Fair use is seen as a limitation on
the rights of copyright owners, but it actually serves a structurally expansive role in relation
to those rights.
2. Fair Use and Private Sphere Activity
Operationally, fair use may appear to benefit members of the public by limiting the
rights of copyright owners; nonetheless, structurally, fair use advantages copyright owners as
a class by allowing their rights to be more expansively defined a priori. This tension between
the structural and operational aspects of the fair use doctrine continues into the present day.
The structural role of fair use in this regard can be seen most readily in relation to the
regulation of the use of copyrighted material in the private sphere. In the domestic context,
fair use has been effectively used by the courts to develop copyright law with more subtlety
than Congress could have conceivably achieved legislating before the fact, and possibly even
after. This illustrates the interrelationship between fair use’s two structural roles. First, fair
use is the flexible counter-weight that enables flexible copyright rights. Second, that
flexibility is achieved by congressional delegation of substantial policy-making responsibility
to the judiciary. The flexible design of both the exclusive rights and of fair use require
judges to adapt copyright to changing circumstances rather than waiting for congressional
guidance which may never arrive.
The extent to which copyright owners can regulate the use of copyrighted material in
the private sphere is one of the most compelling and enduring issues in modern copyright
law. Traditionally, copyright owners have exercised very limited rights with respect to use of
their works in the home for a number of reasons: lack of commercial significance of those
uses, uncertainty as to the application of the rights, and practical difficulties in enforcement.
According to Litman, the scope of allowable copying in the private sphere received little
explicit attention in the revision process for the 1976 Act.146 Congress’ failure to say anything
on the legality of private copying has been roundly criticized, but unfairly so.147
Congressional silence on the issue has in fact allowed the law relating to private copying to
develop in a more nuanced fashion than would have been possible if Congress had acted
more decisively.
Presumably, when the last major revision to Copyright Act was finally passed in
1976, Congress would have been aware that issues would arise in relation to the private use
of copyrighted material.148 Given that awareness, Congress was faced with several choices:
(1) make private use expressly immune from copyright; (2) make private use expressly subject
145.

Bracha, supra note 69.

146.

Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 71, at 52.

147.
Litman criticizes the omission because it has allowed regulation of private copying.
Id. Goldstein takes the opposite view and comments that “[t]he silence of Congress on the issue of
private copies has left a black hole in the centre of American copyright legislation.” Goldstein, supra
note 90, at 107.
148.
See, e.g., the exchange between Representative Beister and the Assistant Register of
Copyrights in relation to off-the-air recording by consumers. June, 1971, Subcommittee No. 3 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F.
Supp. 429, 445 (C.D. Cal. 1979)
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to copyright; (3) try to specify which private uses were immune to copyright, leaving the
remainder subject to copyright; (4) conversely, try to specify which private uses were subject
to copyright, leaving the remainder immune to copyright; or (5) do nothing and leave it to
the courts to determine. As discussed in Part I, in drafting the 1976 Act, Congress was
unusually sensitized to its own inability to predict the how technological change would effect
the balance between copyright owners and the public. As part of the dynamic structure
adopted in 1976, Congress opted by omission to leave questions relating to the private use
of copyrighted material to the courts to resolve by applying the fair use doctrine. Doing so
was the only practical solution given Congress’ preference for expansive and dynamic
exclusive rights.
If Congress had taken option 1 in 1976 and exempted private copying of
copyrighted works from copyright liability, it would have done so in total ignorance of the
potential effects of this choice. In 1976, Congress could not have realized the potential of
personal computers and other devices linked via non-commercial peer-to-peer networks to
displace commercial distribution of music, film, television, video games, and books.149 It is
now apparent that unauthorized peer-to-peer file-sharing of copyrighted works is unlawful,
regardless of whether it is non-commercial or takes place purely within the privacy of
private homes or college dormitories. Unlike unauthorized home video recording for the
purpose of time-shifting, unauthorized file-sharing is not fair use.150 The Supreme Court is
currently considering under what circumstances the distributors of peer-to-peer file-sharing
software may be held liable for uses of their software that infringe third party copyrights.151
Some commentators argue that unauthorized file-sharing should be treated as fair use, or
else covered by some form of compulsory license.152 Interestingly, Justice Stevens’ first draft
of the Sony decision took the view that the exclusive rights of copyright owners had no
application in the private sphere as a matter of statutory interpretation.153 However, since
Sony, drawing any kind of bright-line distinction between public and private has become
increasingly problematic because of the increased capacity of private individuals to rip, mix,
burn and most importantly, file-share.
On the other hand, if Congress had adopted option 2 and made no allowance for
the private use of copyrighted material, the resulting law would have been both
extraordinarily oppressive and unpopular. First, Congress probably could not have

149.

Goldstein, supra note 90, at 106.

150.
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) (direct
infringement by users of P2P file-sharing service undisputed); A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (unauthorized P2P file-sharing not fair use).
151.
granted).

MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct.[cite to US] 686 (2004) (certiorari

152.
William W. Fisher III, Promises To Keep: Technology, Law, And The Future
Of Entertainment (2004) (compulsory license); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial
Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2003) (same); Raymond
S. Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital
Technology, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (2002) (fair use).
153.

Goldstein, supra note 90, at 122.
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anticipated that the exclusive reproduction right it bestowed on copyright owners would be
effectively transformed into an exclusive use right in the digital context. Consider that the
user of a book simply picks it up and begins to read; whereas, the equivalent activity in a
digital medium requires first making a copy in random access memory of a computer.154 It is
seems unlikely that the public could be expected to tolerate this radical expansion of
copyright without some assurance that their rights to use copyrighted material in the ways
they had always used it would not be too greatly effected. Fair use provides that assurance,
albeit somewhat uncertainly at the margins.
Second, on their face, the exclusive rights of the copyright owner are infringed by
any number of seemingly harmless private activities. Examples include: time-shifting
broadcast television (copying); converting music on CD into a format compatible with a
portable device (also copying);155 and singing “Happy Birthday To You” at a restaurant open
to the public (public performance).156 That these examples do not constitute copyright
infringement illustrates a more general principle: the exclusive rights of copyright owners are
not absolute, their application varies according to the context.157
The blanket solutions of option 1 and option 2 are infeasible; what of options 3 and
4? To some extent, Congress has pursued option 3 in an attempt to strike a balance between
the interests of owners and the public in relation to private use of copyrighted material, by
specifying some activities as non-infringing.158 However, these specific exemptions represent

154.
See, MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. 991 F.2d 511, 518–19 (9th Cir. 1993) see
also, 2–8 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.08.
155.
There is considerable debate over whether time shifting and format shifting are in
fact harmless, but it is safe to say most people think they are. See Mary Madden & Amanda Lenhart,
Music Downloading, File-sharing and Copyright: A Pew Internet Project Data Memo, July 2003,
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/PIP_Copyright_Memo.pdf (finding that 67%
of Internet users who download music don’t care whether the music they download is copyrighted).
Even the Recording Industry Association of America acknowledges that consumers are entitled to
make copies of their own CDs for personal use on computers and portable music players.
Presumably, the fair use doctrine is the source of that entitlement. See the RIAA website at
http://www.riaa.com/issues/ask/default.asp#stand (last visited May 11, 2004) (on file with author).
156.
The Copyright Act only gives copyright owners an exclusive right to the public
performance of a musical work, however, the statutory definition of when a work is performed
“publicly” appears broad enough to include a restaurant so long as it is “open to the public” or “a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances”
can gather there. 17 U.S.C. § 101 ([date]). Whether “Happy Birthday To You” is in fact still subject to
copyright is subject to some uncertainty, see Litman, Sharing, supra note 73, at 50 and footnote 111;
Scott M. Martin, The Mythology Of The Public Domain: Exploring The Myths Behind Attacks On
The Duration Of Copyright Protection, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 253, 322, footnote 61 (2002).
157.
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) (the
law has never recognized an author’s right to absolute control of his work).
158.
For example, 17 U.S.C. § 117 authorizes the owner of a copy of a computer
program to make a copy or adaptation of the program as an essential step in the utilization of the
computer program, subject to certain limitations. The same section also authorizes an archival copy.
Id.
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only a small fraction of the what the public is in fact entitled to do with copyrighted material
in the private sphere.159 As discussed earlier, the obsolescence of the AHRA illustrates the
difficulties of effectively addressing these issues before they occur and the likelihood that
existing solutions quickly become stale in the context of fast-changing technology and
consumer behavior.160 Clearly, the limitations that affect option 3 apply with at least equal
force to option 4, but the consequences may even greater because of the different default
rule.
In the majority of cases, instead of attempting to specify the circumstances in which
private uses would or would not constitute copyright infringement, Congress has “taken the
fifth” and left it to the courts to make that determination on a case-by-case basis by applying
the fair use doctrine.
Judges are of course entitled to question the wisdom of congressional delegation,
both in relation to private sphere copying and more generally. Nonetheless, until Congress
enacts more detailed policy, judges are stuck with making most of the hard decisions. The
question is, how should they make them?
As discussed in Part I, the four factors contained in the statutory elaboration of the
fair use doctrine should be seen as question-framing as opposed to outcome-determinative.
Congress has given the courts a framework for deciding fair use cases, however it is still the
responsibility of the courts to determine the scope of the copyright owner’s rights in
particular situations. This explains one half of the structural role of fair use, that it is a
standard that shifts policy making responsibility from the legislature to the judiciary.
Structurally, the flexible and dynamic nature of fair use renders it both the counterweight to, and the enabler of, the equally flexible and dynamic exclusive rights of copyright
owners. The structural role of fair use allows the judiciary to adapt copyright law in response
to new technologies or other external forces. This is especially significant given the broad
expression of copyright owners’ exclusive rights in the 1976 Act, and the increased breadth
and duration of copyright protection brought about by the abandonment of formalities such
as copyright registration, notice and renewal.
One of the more interesting implications of the structural role of fair use is that fair
use actually benefits copyright owners as a class by facilitating a more expansive definitions
of their rights. This suggests that judges should disregard theories that view fair use as
merely a tax on copyright owners, or an ad hoc redistribution of entitlements. It also
suggests that judges need to carefully consider the allocation of the burden of proof in
where the defendant raises fair use as a defense to copyright infringement. The
jurisprudential implications of the structural role of fair use are considered in the next
section.

159.
In addition to the fair use examples already mentioned in this paper, it should be
noted that “[n]o license is required by the Copyright Act, for example, to sing a copyrighted lyric in
the shower.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 155 (1975).
160.

See notes 103–105 and accompanying text, supra.
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Part IV—Jurisprudential Implications
Judges can not avoid making copyright policy in fair use cases. As discussed in the
preceding sections, the indeterminacy of the statutory fair use factors, and the reluctance (or
inability) of the legislature to enact specific rules in response to technological and social
changes affecting copyright, necessitates that judges fill in the substantial gaps in copyright
law.
How should judges make sense of the jumble of case law and theory of the last 200
years? The preceding structural analysis of fair use suggests that Congress has decided that
the indeterminacy of a flexible fair use standard is preferable to the potential rigidity of
anything more specific. The Supreme Court has also stressed the benefits of flexibility in its
admonition to avoid the application of bright-line rules in fair use.161 Given this
indeterminacy, how can judges decide fair use cases in a principled and non-arbitrary way?
A comprehensive survey of the literature addressing this question is beyond the
scope of this article. Nonetheless, it is possible to parse the majority of the literature into
three different schools of thought: the cost-benefit analysis school; the external normative
framework school; and the internal normative framework school. The meaning of these
labels will become apparent shortly.
A. Existing Approaches to Determining Fair Use
The essence of a cost-benefit analysis approach to fair use is a comparison of the
costs versus the benefits of allowing the unauthorized use to continue. However, this simple
statement belies the complexity and diversity of opinions as to exactly how such a test might
be implemented. Wendy Gordon, for example, proposes that a finding of fair use should be
conditioned on the presence of market failure and a cost-benefit analysis that indicates a net
gain in social value in allowing the unauthorized use to continue.162 In contrast to Gordon,
Glynn Lunney proposes a pure form of cost-benefit analysis without the filter of market
failure.163 Elsewhere I have undertaken a detailed examination of competing law and
economics analyses of fair use.164 A few preliminary observations are worth making. First,
viewing fair use as market failure necessarily characterizes fair use as an exception the norm
of unbounded copyright rights. As has been shown, fair use plays a fundamental role in both

161.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)

162.
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1614 (1982). Gordon initially
proposed a further requirement that “an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the
incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner.” However, Gordon herself has subsequently retreated
from that very limiting proposition. See Gordon, The “Market Failure” And Intellectual Property: A
Response To Professor Lunney, 82 B.U.L. Rev. 1031, 1032 (2002). Gordon also stresses that market
failure is not confined to transactions costs (as many have assumed) but incorporates, informational
asymmetries, endowment effects and negative externalities as well. Id.
163.

Glynn S. Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 975

164.
with author).

Matthew Sag, The Law And Economics Of Fair Use (2005) (working paper, on file

(2002).
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bounding and thereby enabling expansive copyright rights; fair use is more than an ad hoc
exception to market failure. Second, cost-benefit analysis asks judges to undertake a difficult
and speculative factual inquiry. In that context, allocation of burden of proof is likely to be
more outcome-determinative than the actual costs and benefits themselves. Third, even if a
case-by-case cost-benefit analysis were feasible, its administrative costs may well overshadow
any gains in allocative efficiency that it achieves. Consequently, cost-benefit analysis, with or
without a prerequisite of market failure, provides little guidance to judges as to how to
actually decide fair use cases.
In contrast to the exacting methodology of the cost-benefit approach, a number of
judges and scholars have suggested that fair use decisions should be made primarily with
recourse to normative conceptions of “the good.”165 Perhaps the most well known
proponent of this analysis is William Fisher. Fisher proposes reconstructing the fair use
doctrine to “advance a substantive conception of a just and attractive intellectual culture” – a
vision of “the good life and the sort of society that would facilitate its widespread
realization.”166 To achieve this goal, Fisher extrapolates a set of preferences from various
schools of political philosophy.167 While Fisher’s proposal is thoughtfully developed, it
nonetheless amounts to little more than a collection of thinly substantiated preferences,168
reflecting one man’s vision of the good life.169
Whether viewed as a subsidy or an entitlement, resorting to normative orderings as a
guide for implementing fair use is problematic for at least three reasons. First and most
obvious is the difficulty of locating an objective basis for any particular ordering. Second,
reliance on preference orderings could easily generate perverse results. For example, allowing
a generous scope for fair use in a particular market, such as education materials, might
reduce incentives for production in that very market. Third, applying fair use based on
preference orderings as opposed to conduct is not a close fit with the objectives of
copyright, expressed in the Constitution as the encouragement of the progress of science
and the useful arts, not the progress of scientists and useful artists.
Commentators such as Lloyd Weinreb and Michael Madison advocate a variation of
grounding fair use decisions on orderings of social preferences.170 They argue that fair use

165.
See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Merges, supra note 132, at 132–35 (advocates express recognition of fair
use as both a tax on copyright owners and a subsidy in favor of certain classes of users)
166.
1744 (1988).

William W. Fisher, Reconstructing The Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1661,

167.

Id. at 1745–1762.

168.

Fisher’s preference for symphonies over television being one example. Id. at 1768.

169.
See Weinreb, Fair Use, supra note 68, at 1305 (“To concede that the vision is
utopian is not enough, for the vision that Professor Fisher presented is only one utopian vision
among a great many.”)
170.
Michael Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 Wm and Mary L.
Rev. 1525 (2004) (calling for more explicit acknowledgment of the role of “favored practices” and
“accepted patterns” in fair use analysis); Lloyd L. Weinreb Fair’s Fair: A Comment On The Fair Use
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should concentrate on accepted norms and customary practice as the basis for determining
the scope of the copyright owner’s legitimate interests. Relying on the wisdom of the past
assumes that those norms and practices were appropriate to begin with and are applicable
now, both of which may be incorrect. Furthermore, as technology and society continue to
change, it will always be contested whose accepted norms should be applied or which
customary practice is most applicable.
For example, file-sharers argue that their activities are consistent with an ethic of
sharing and past practices, such as recording and sharing mixed tapes. They equate filesharing with norms of individual autonomy which thrive on the internet, such as selfexpression, and creative collaboration.171 The recording industry argues that there is no
precedent for consumers making perfect substitutes for the industry’s products, and that
legitimate sharing has never allowed wholesale copying.172 Opponents of file-sharing equate
it with theft and argue that it threatens the livelihoods of authors, artists, and a multi-billiondollar-a-year industry. Both sides in this debate rely on the virtue of preexisting, but
inconsistent, norms and practices; this illustrates that reliance on existing norms and
practices provides little guidance to judges in deciding fair use conflicts.
The third approach to answering this question looks at the fundamental principles
underlying copyright law itself. Looking to the institution of copyright itself for the
assumptions necessary to form fair use analysis is preferable to an unbounded normative
inquiry precisely because it is limited. In spite of its non-statutory nature, transformative use
has quickly become the dominant factor in fair use analysis.173 The Supreme Court derived
the transformative use test from its understanding of the purpose of copyright law itself. As
the Court explained, the goal of copyright is the promotion of science and the arts, and that
in turn requires some freedom for present authors to build on the works of the past.
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any,
things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout.
Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily
borrow, and use much which was well known and used before. No man
creates a new language for himself, at least if he be a wise man, in writing a
book. He contents himself with the use of language already known and used
and understood by others. No man writes exclusively from his own thoughts,
unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of others. The thoughts of every
man are, more or less, a combination of what other men have thought and
expressed, although they may be modified, exalted, or improved by his own
genius or reflection.174
Doctrine, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1137 (1990), (fairness as compliance with accepted norms and
customary practice).
171.

Netanel, supra note 152, at 2.

172.

Id.

173.
Jeremy Kudon, Form Over Function: Expanding The Transformative Use Test For
Fair Use, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 579, 597 (2000).
174.
Justice Story in Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (CCD Mass.
1845); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
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From this foundation the Court concluded that transformative works—any work
which “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning, or message” to the original—deserve special recognition in
fair use.175
This paper has proposed a structural understanding of fair use as the mechanism
through which Congress has transferred a significant policy making to the judiciary. Judges
should recognize fair use decisions as a policy making exercise; however, they should also be
cognizant of the appropriate limits of policy making in that context. Specifically, judges
should work within the framework that Congress has given them, and that framework is the
law of copyright.
Transformative uses are given preference under the theory that encouraging the
production of new works that embrace and extend existing works benefits society. The
unstated assumption here is either that transformative uses are inherently good or that
transformative uses are more likely than non-transformative uses to be welfare enhancing.
Both of these assumptions are consistent with the Constitutional mandate for copyright,
which is the promotion of the progress of science and useful arts, as opposed to the
promotion of public welfare in general.176 Although the preamble does not create a
substantive limitation on congressional power,177 it nonetheless informs our understanding
of what copyright is and how the copyright system is supposed to function.
Until now, this approach has been confined to the concept of transformativeness.
But it follows from this article’s structural analysis that the third approach can be expanded
to incorporate other principles from copyright law. Although these principles are also
normative, they have greater legitimacy as they are based in doctrinal principles, not just
individual preferences. Additionally, these doctrinal norms are at least loosely based on
congressional preferences since they are drawn from copyright law and its constitutional
mandate.
B. A New Approach: Applying Copyright Principles to Animate Fair Use
Judge Pierre Leval has urged courts to make transformative use the predominant
factor in their analysis and to “resist the impulse to import extraneous policies.”
Nonetheless, the limitations of transformativeness suggest that other factors must also be
considered. Limiting judicial discretion to principles inherent within copyright itself makes
sense, but transformative use is not the only animating principle from within copyright law
to which judges should look.
Transformative use is far from the end of the fair use inquiry. There are a number of
uses that do not appear to be transformative, but are nonetheless fair use. For example,
transformative use does not offer a satisfactory explanation for the fair use status of
untransformative reproduction of materials for use in the classroom provided for in Section
175.

Id. at 579.

176.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

177.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211 (2003). Nimmer observes that “In fact, the
introductory phrase, rather than constituting a limitation on congressional authority, has for the most
part tended to expand such authority.” 1–1 Nimmer on Copyright § 1.03.
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107 itself.178 Nor can it explain the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sony that noncommercial timeshifting of broadcast television is fair use. Transformative use also fails to provide a
convincing explanation of the fair use status of reverse engineering of computer software,
discussed in detail below.
In addition to these omissions, transformative use also has an ambiguous
relationship with derivative works. As Jeremy Kudon has observed, the definition of
derivative work appears to entirely overlap with the concept of transformative use.179
Distinguishing between infringing derivative works and transformative works requires some
concept of what the appropriate boundaries of the copyright owner’s derivative rights
should be. Transformativeness appears to be a conclusion rather than a test. Finally, because
transformativeness typically applies to critical works such as parody or review, a number of
scholars have expressed concern that transformativeness has made some kind of critical
element a necessary prerequisite for fair use.180
These criticisms do not imply that transformativeness is an inappropriate guiding
principle; rather they show that it can not be the only guiding principle elaborating the
meaning and application of fair use. Other fundamental principles of copyright have a role
to play in fleshing out fair use, once fair use’s structural role is understood. Three key
principles from copyright that may also play an animating role in fair use are: the idea
expression distinction, consumer autonomy and medium neutrality.
1. The Idea Expression Distinction
Copyright is celebrated as the “engine of free expression” because of the incentives
it establishes for the creation and dissemination of information.181 However, the efficiency
of that engine depends on the effectiveness of the idea expression distinction. As the
Supreme Court explained in Harper & Row, the idea expression distinction “strikes a
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author’s expression.”182 Where particular
situations and advances in technology threaten to undermine the idea expression distinction,
courts have applied fair use to reinforce this copyright principle.
Cases addressing the reverse engineering of computer software illustrate the
importance of applying fair use to preserve the idea expression distinction. Computer
programs are written in source code, a human readable language, but they are typically

178.
17 U.S.C. § 107 ([date]). “Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A
the fair use of a copyrighted work, . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.”
179.
Kudon, supra 173, at 592. A problem acknowledged but unresolved in Lavel’s
original formulation. See Leval, supra note 29, at 1111–1112.
180.

Bunker, supra note 114, at 17.

181.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
182.

Id. at 556.
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distributed in object code which is only readable by computers.183 The object code
distributed on a compact discs or in the memory of a video game consoles is protected by
copyright,184 and yet the same object code also contains ideas and performs functions that
are not entitled to copyright protection.185 Unlike other copyright protected works, the
unprotectable elements of computer programs distributed in object code are hidden from
view. With the right tools, experienced programmers can extract the unprotectable elements
from object code, however these methods almost invariably require making an unauthorized
copy, or multiple unauthorized copies, of the program.
Federal courts have consistently held that making unauthorized copies of a computer
program as a necessary step in reverse engineering is fair use.186 The Ninth Circuit reverse
engineering case of Sony v. Connectix,187 illustrates the centrality of preserving the idea
expression distinction and promoting legitimate competition. From the beginning of its
decision, the court emphasized the importance of the idea expression distinction: “[W]e are
called upon once again to apply the principles of copyright law to computers and their
software, to determine what must be protected as expression and what must be made
accessible to the public as function.188”
Consistent with its decision in Sega,189 the court held that intermediate copying of
software could be protected as fair use if the copying was necessary to gain access to the
functional elements of the software.190 The court based its ruling firmly in the importance of
maintaining the idea expression distinction. “We drew this distinction because the Copyright
Act protects expression only, not ideas or the functional aspects of a software program. …
Thus, the fair use doctrine preserves public access to the ideas and functional elements
embedded in copyrighted computer software programs.”191

183.
Source code is translated into a set of instructions for a particular type of machine
through a process known as compilation. The resulting object code consists literally of a long
sequence of ones and zeros that is then capable of running on a machine; to say that object code is
‘read’ by the machine does not imply that it is comprehended. For a more detailed discussion see,
Daniel Lin, Matthew Sag & Ron S. Laurie, Source Code Versus Object Code, 18 Santa Clara
Computer & High Tech. L.J. 235.
184.

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) ([date]).

185.

Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir.

2000).
186.
E.g., Sony, 203 F.3d at 602 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000); Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992); see also David Rice, Copyright and Contract: Preemption
After Bowers v. Baystate, 9 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 595, 598, (2004) footnote 19 for further
references.
187.

, 203 F.3d 596.

188.

Id. at 598.

189.

Sega, 977 F.2d 1510.

190.

Sony, 203 F.3d at 604; Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524–26.

191.

Sony, 203 F.3d at 603.
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The Ninth Circuit decided that the first fair use factor, the nature and purpose of the
use, favored the defendant in this case because it deemed reverse engineering to be legitimate
purpose, based on its understanding of the requirements of the idea expression
distinction.192 To comply with the perceived requirement that all fair uses must be
transformative, the court unconvincingly asserted that the defendant’s product was
“modestly transformative,”193 a conclusion based solely on characteristics of the defendant’s
non-infringing end product rather than its intermediate copying. The court was distorting
the concept of transformativeness because it clearly considered that fair use should apply to
reverse engineering. If the court had recognized that other principles of copyright can guide
the application of fair use, not just transformativeness, these judicial acrobatics would have
been unnecessary. The importance of the idea expression distinction alone should have been
enough to include reverse engineering within the contours of fair use.
The Ninth Circuit’s understanding of the idea expression distinction was also central
to its determination of the market effect of Connectix’s reverse engineering, the fourth fair
use factor. The fourth factor requires courts to look beyond the mere presence of an effect
on the market or potential market of the copyright owner and ask whether the market so
effected is one which copyright protects. In Campbell, the Supreme Court quite plainly
differentiated the copyright owner’s general economic interests from the limited protection
afforded by copyright.194 Copyright neither protects the copyright owner from parody, nor
recognizes a protectable derivative market for criticism in general.195 Just as Campbell
recognizes that criticism is outside of the copyright owner’s protectable sphere of interest,
the reverse engineering cases recognize that the copyright owner has no protectable interest
in preventing the copying of unprotectable expression and ideas buried within its object
code. In Sony v Connectix, the Ninth Circuit held that although the defendant’s Virtual
Game Station console directly competed with Sony in the market for gaming platforms
compatible with Sony games, the Virtual Game Station was a “legitimate competitor” in that
market.196 The court concluded that Sony’s desire to control the market for gaming
platforms was “understandable” but that “copyright law … does not confer such a
monopoly.”197 Principles such as the idea expression distinction inform the a priori
assumptions that courts must make before they can apply the fair use doctrine in general or
the four statutory factors in particular.

192.

Id. at 607.

193.

Id. at 606.

194.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 591–592 (1994).

195.

Id. at 592.

196.
Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir.
2000); see also, Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522–23 (9th Cir. 1993).
197.
Sony, 203 F.3d at 607; see also, Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523–24 (An attempt to
monopolize the market by making it impossible for others to compete runs counter to the statutory
purpose of promoting creative expression and cannot constitute a strong equitable basis for resisting
the invocation of the fair use doctrine).
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2. Consumer Autonomy
Justifying fair use in terms of critical transformative appropriation, or the necessity
of maintaining the idea expression distinction, may address the majority of fair use decisions
that courts are called on to make. They do not, however, bring us any closer to rationalizing
the fair use status of uncritical appropriation, such as consumer time shifting which was the
subject of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sony. This subsection speculates that in addition
to transformativeness and preserving the idea expression distinction, there is a third guiding
principle that can be read into copyright – consumer autonomy.
Copyright’s first sale doctrine and significant cases in other areas, such as Sony,
appear to hinge upon an underlying notion of consumer autonomy. This principle has not
been explicitly articulated in the cases, but it is both a normatively appealing concept and it
provides a principled explanation for a range of developments. If consumer autonomy does
come to be recognized by the courts, it too should be a copyright principle used to elucidate
fair use.
To the extent that a principle of consumer autonomy exists, it is based on a
combination of the first sale doctrine and the omission of “use” from the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner. Under the first sale doctrine, the copyright owner’s exclusive right to
distribute a work is limited to its first sale, and the owner of a copy of a work is entitled to
sell or otherwise dispose of that copy without permission from the copyright owner, so long
as the copy was lawfully made in the first place.198 The copyright owner has the sole right to
make copies and sell them, but for each copy sold, the owner’s right to control distribution
of any particular copy is exhausted by the first sale of that copy. According to the Supreme
Court, “[t]he whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places a
copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive
statutory right to control its distribution.”199
It has been suggested that the first sale doctrine has been weakened by technological
changes, especially in the realm of computer software.200 Several courts have now accepted
the proposition that the transfer of data from a permanent storage device to a computer’s
random access memory (“RAM”) constitutes a “copying” for purposes of copyright law.201
However, Section 117 of the Copyright Act limits the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner with respect to computer programs. That section provides that the owner of a copy
198.

17 U.S.C. § 109(a) ([date]), but note the exclusions in 109(b).

199.

Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152

(1998).
200.
For a nuanced discussion of the impact of technology on the first sale doctrine, see
R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. Rev 577
(2003).
201.
Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs. Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101–02 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). In addition to the DC Circuit
and the Ninth Circuit, the RAM copying doctrine has been accepted by a number of lower courts,
although implicitly rejected by others. See Anthony Reece, The Public Display Right: The Copyright
Act’s Neglected Solution To The Controversy Over RAM “Copies”, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 83, 139 and
the cases cited therein.
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of a program is entitled to load a copy of that program to the computer’s RAM if that is “an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine.”202
How far the RAM copying doctrine really extends the right of copyright owners to
effectively control the “use” of their software depends on the proper interpretation the
Section 117 exemption.203
The first sale doctrine combined with the absence of any “use” right in copyright
allow a strong degree of autonomy for consumers; copyright owners are generally unable to
control the use (as opposed to copying) of their works by the public. For example, the seller
of a remotely activated garage door (operated by embedded software) has no right to control
how many times it is opened or which brand of garage door opener is used to open it.204
Similarly, the publisher of a magazine presumably has no right to control the order in which
individual copies are read by consumers.
In the Galoob case,205 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Game Genie, a device
that enhanced the operation of the Nintendo gaming platform (by allowing players to move
differently and have more lives), did not infringe Nintendo’s copyright because it neither
copied Nintendo’s games nor made derivative works of them.206 The court declined to
stretch the definition of derivative work to include altering the way a video game was played,
for fear of chilling innovation in computer applications.207 The court concluded that a
program or device that improves the performance of a copyrighted program without
copying it does not create a derivative work of the initial program, even if it changes the way
the initial program is perceived or displayed.208
These cases and the first sale doctrine itself rest on the logic of a principle of
consumer autonomy. Nonetheless,the question remains: is there a freestanding principle of
consumer autonomy that can inform fair use analysis, assuming that one or more of the
copyright owner’s exclusive rights appear to have been infringed? Sony sheds some light on
this question.
In Sony, the majority explained that although consumers who engaged in timeshifting of broadcast television copied the entire program – a factor that usually weighs
heavily against fair use – the extent of their copying did not have its ordinary effect because
202.

17 U.S.C. § 117 (date).

203.
See generally, 2–8 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.08. The critical questions in this
regard are: (1) what rights do consumers have to use third party parts and services in combination
with copyrighted digital content; (2) what rights do consumers have to modify or upgrade
copyrighted digital content; and (3) to what extent can copyright owners can bind consumers to
contractual restrictions that conflict with their rights under the first sale doctrine? As interesting as
these questions are, this is not the place to address them.
204.

Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1187 (Fed. Cir.

205.

Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).

206.

Id. at 969.

207.

Id.

208.

Id.

2004).
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“time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to
witness in its entirety free of charge.”209 In other words: once a copyrighted work is lawfully
placed into the hands of a consumer, the consumer is free to consume the product as she
chooses, regardless of whether the copyright owner would prefer that she consume in some
other fashion.
The same logic was applied in Galoob, where the Ninth Circuit held that even if the
Game Genie created a derivative work (they held it did not), consumers were nonetheless
entitled to use the Game Genie in conjunction with games they had lawfully acquired.210 In
both Sony and Galoob, the courts held that copyright owner’s exclusive rights did not reach
so far as to control the precise manner in which consumers used their works, provided that
consumers paid the going price.
A principle of consumer autonomy is also evident in Recording Industry Association
of America’s (“RIAA”) ill-fated challenge to portable MP3 players.211 The RIAA sought to
enjoin the manufacture and distribution of Diamond Rio’s MP3 player, alleging that it did
not meet the requirements for digital audio recording devices under the AHRA.212 As a
matter of statutory interpretation, the court held that the AHRA did not apply to either a
computer hard-drive, or a device that merely received files from a computer hard-drive.213 In
passing, the court commented on the purpose of the AHRA, which it viewed as “the
facilitation of personal use.”214 The court adopted the words of the House report, explaining
that the AHRA’s home taping exemption, “protects all noncommercial copying by
consumers of digital and analog musical recordings.”215 Echoing Sony, the court analogized
transferring music from a CD to a portable MP3 player to recording broadcast television for
the purpose of time-shifting. “The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or
‘space-shift,’ those files that already reside on a user’s hard drive. Such copying is
paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the
Act.”216

209.

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-450 (1984).

210.
Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 971 (consumers are not invited to witness
Nintendo’s audiovisual displays free of charge, but, once they have paid to do so, the fact that the
derivative works created by the Game Genie are comprised almost entirely of Nintendo’s
copyrighted displays does not militate against a finding of fair use).
211.

Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.

1999).
212.
17 U.S.C. §§ 1002(a)(1), (2) (digital audio recording device required to conform to
the Serial Copy Management System); Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 180 F.3d 1072.
213.

Id. at 1078–1079.

Id. at 1079; see also Senate report, “the purpose of [the Act] is to ensure the right
214.
of consumers to make analog or digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for their private,
noncommercial use.” S. Rep. No. 102-294, at *86.
215.

17 U.S.C. § 1008 ([date]), see H.R. Rep. No. 102-873(I), at *59.

216.

Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 180 F.3d at 1079 (citation & quote omitted).
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The idea of consumer autonomy as a guiding principle for fair use can, of course, be
taken too far. There is an important distinction to made between consumer autonomy for
consumers acting as consumers as opposed to consumers acting as potential rivals of the
copyright owner. In Napster, the district court held that the copying which the file-sharing
service facilitated did not qualify as “personal use in the traditional sense.”217 The district
court saw “critical differences” between Napster’s try-then-buy argument218 and the use of
VCRs for time-shifting. An individual Napster user “who downloads a copy of a song to her
hard drive may make that song available to millions of other individuals, even if she
eventually chooses to purchase the CD,”219 whereas time-shifting broadcast television or
space-shifting music to a portable device does not distribute the copyrighted work beyond
the intended user. On appeal the Ninth Circuit similarly distinguished the “shifting” analyses
of Sony and Diamond because of the difference between personal use and distribution of
the work.220 So, clearly multiple courts are at least implicitly adopting an underlying concept
of consumer autonomy.
Copyright law allows some forms of price discrimination, such as temporal market
segmentation and versioning. For example, high priced hardcover books are released earlier
than cheaper paperbacks and are also more durable. Yet copyright and other laws generally
limit the content owner’s control of her products once released into the stream of
commerce,221 so there is clearly no absolute right to price discriminate. At any rate, before
they can fully embrace the notion of consumer autonomy, courts should consider whether
the copyright owner has an interest in price discrimination that outweighs considerations of
consumer autonomy. Nevertheless, there is some support for the notion of consumer
autonomy as a fundamental principle of copyright; indeed it is difficult to explain the
evidentiary presumptions applied in Sony on any other theory.
3. Medium Neutrality
Finally, in addition to copyright’s preference for transformative uses, maintaining the
idea expression distinction and (possibly) preserving consumer autonomy, fair use analysis
should also recognize the importance of medium neutrality. Medium neutrality is the
principle that a use should not receive less protection, simply by virtue of being expressed in
a different medium.

217.

A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2000).

218.
Napster argued that unauthorized file-sharing did not have an adverse market effect
on copyright owners because file-sharers might become consumers after sampling music on-line.
219.

A & M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913 (N.D. Cal. 2000).

220.
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001). (“Both
Diamond and Sony are inapposite because the methods of shifting in these cases did not also
simultaneously involve distribution of the copyrighted material to the general public; the time or
space-shifting of copyrighted material exposed the material only to the original user.”)
221.
For example, antitrust law prohibits resale price maintenance. For a more detailed
discussion of the uncertain case for price discrimination in the context of intellectual property, see
James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital
Intellectual Property, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2007 (2000).
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Medium neutrality is not a principle inherent to copyright in the same way as those
listed above; however, it provides a useful reality check against importing unwarranted
assumptions as to the illegitimacy of non-mainstream points of view and non-mainstream
vehicles of expression. There is no reason to reject the unequal treatment of different media
of expression out of hand, but unless Congress has indicated a preference for or against a
particular medium, courts should at least be suspicious of analysis that leads to unequal
treatment.
Again, the reverse engineering cases provide support for the idea of medium
neutrality in the sense of preserving the idea expression distinction in computer software.
The abstract idea of a storyline is not protected by copyright, even though it is contained in
the text of a protected novel; nor are facts, dates and historical events, even if they are
contained in a protected history book. Medium neutrality dictates that uncopyrightable
programming structures and APIs should not receive special protection by virtue of being
released in object code which makes them unreadable to humans. Consistent with the
principle of medium neutrality, courts allow reverse engineering of object code to discover
these unprotectable elements.
Computer software is not exceptional in this regard; even within more conventional
media, there is a strong case for a presumption of neutrality. For example, a recent Eleventh
Circuit decision, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,222 indicates that courts attempt to
accord equal treatment and respect to all forms of criticism, even if some necessitate more
copying than others. In that case, the court ruled that Alice Randall’s retelling of “Gone
With The Wind” (“GWTW”) from the perspective of Scarlet’s African-American half-sister
was clearly a criticism and a parody of the original. Using this literary device as the vehicle
for her rejoinder to the perceived racism of GWTW223 required Randall to appropriate much
more of the original than would have been required for other methods, such as a literary
essay.
In a very strong statement suggesting the importance of medium neutrality, the
Eleventh Circuit held: “The fact that Randall chose to convey her criticisms of GWTW
through a work of fiction, which she contends is a more powerful vehicle for her message
than a scholarly article, does not, in and of itself, deprive TWDG of fair-use protection.”224
The court held that even though Randall had made extensive use of characters, plot
points and settings in GWTW, her work was capable of fair use protection because the

222.

268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).

223.
Id. at 1269–1270. (“In the world of GWTW, the white characters comprise a noble
aristocracy whose idyllic existence is upset only by the intrusion of Yankee soldiers, and, eventually,
by the liberation of the black slaves. Through her characters as well as through direct narration,
Mitchell describes how both blacks and whites were purportedly better off in the days of slavery:
“The more I see of emancipation the more criminal I think it is. It’s just ruined the darkies,” says
Scarlett O’Hara. Free blacks are described as “creatures of small intelligence . . . like monkeys or
small children turned loose among treasured objects whose value is beyond their comprehension,
they ran wild—either from perverse pleasure in destruction or simply because of their ignorance.”)
(citations omitted).
224.

Id. at 1269.
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extent of that borrowing was required by the critical genre she had chosen.225 What separates
Randall’s work from mere fan fiction is its critical element – the court was convinced that
Randall’s book was “principally and purposefully a critical statement.”226 Based on that
conviction it was willing to allow Randall enough freedom to achieve her critical purpose in
her chosen medium. This lends support to the argument that medium neutrality is an
important copyright principle, and so should be incorporated into fair use analysis.
C. Assessment
Fair use would be much more certain and much easier to administer if Congress had
formulated policy more completely and given courts a set of bright-line rules to follow.
Instead, Congress has relieved itself of the burden of difficult decisions and left the
judiciary to apply a vague and open ended standard. The merits of this choice are debatable,
but the consequences for judges in fair use cases seem clear – they have no choice but to
engage in policy making.
In this paper I have suggested that in order to make policy in relation to fair use,
judges should restrict themselves to one toolkit – principles derived from copyright law. This
approach lacks the lure of simple and immediate answers offered by a cost-benefit analysis,
but it is a far more realistic exercise to expect judges to undertake, given the limits of judicial
resources and the speculative nature of any case-by-case empirical inquiry. The approach
suggested here must also be contrasted against that of encouraging courts to justify their
assumptions in terms of an unlimited normative inquiry, or the closely related proposition
of accepted norms and customary practice. Confining a judge’s search for grounding
assumptions to principles she can justify in terms of copyright law itself is still a normative
exercise, but it is a sharply more limited one. These limits are important because they will,
over time, lead to the development of a more stable and predictable fair use jurisprudence.
Conclusion
Deus ex machina, literally “god from the machine,” refers to the resolution of an
apparently insoluble crisis through divine intervention. In ancient Greek dramas, an
intervening god was often brought on stage by an elaborate piece of equipment; thus the
expression, god from the machine. Fair use is the god in the copyright machine. Unlike the
Greek gods, who were unconstrained by reality, fair use does not dissolve the inherent
conflict arising from opposing interests, but it is the mechanism for their resolution.
Law and technology interact with consequences that are fundamentally
unpredictable. What is predictable is that copyright law will need to be continually adapted to
the demands of changing circumstances. Fair use plays a vital role in the copyright system by
facilitating change. The flexibility of both the rights of copyright owners, and the fair use
that can be made of copyrighted works, stems from Congress’ delegation of policy-making
responsibility to the judiciary. Fair use is the structure through which the conflict between
the needs for certainty and adaptability can be resolved.
Fair use has a curious and misunderstood relationship with the rights of copyright
owners. Many emphasize fair use’s role in limiting those rights. However, the fair use
225.

Id. at 1267.

226.

Id. at 1270.
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doctrine has also enabled the expansion of copyright rights, precisely because it establishes a
flexible boundary on those rights. Historically, and in a contemporary setting, fair use has
benefited copyright owners by facilitating a more expansive and dynamic definition of their
rights than would be otherwise possible.
Those who see fair use as stemming the tide of copyright expansion are bound to be
disappointed. Congress has seen fit to radically expand the application, duration and scope
of rights associated with copyright; there is little point wishing the courts would apply the
fair use doctrine in order to derail this agenda. Nonetheless, fair use remains an important
counter-weight to the broad rights of copyright owners. Properly applied, fair use ensures
significant freedom for criticism, commentary, reference, innovation and experimentation.
Congress has delegated substantial policy making discretion to judges so that they can apply
fair use in this fashion, as changing circumstances require. Thus fair use is actually working
as intended: fair use is not a failed protector of the status quo, but rather it is a successful
agent of change.
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